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ORIGINAL LETTERS

FROM THE

FRENCH ARMY

IN

EGYPT.

PART THE THIRD,

CONSISTING OF THOSE

LETTERS TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, INTERCEPTED BY THE  
BRITISH FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN,

WHICH HAVE BEEN

PUBLISHED HERE BY AUTHORITY.

*K France. Army.*

NINTH EDITION.

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## INTRODUCTION.

THE Letters and Dispatches, of which the following are copies, have been recently intercepted, on their passage from Egypt to France, by the British Squadron in the Mediterranean; and have since been printed here by the authority of Government.

They are reprinted in their present shape, by the editors of two former collections on the same subject, for the more general information of the Public.

These letters, and indeed the whole of those from among which they are selected, are addressed, either to the late French Government, or to different individuals composing it; and are evidently the first that have been sent from the remnant of the French Army in Egypt since the desertion of General BONAPARTE.

Among them is a copy of the Instructions which BONAPARTE addressed to KLÉBER, at his departure. It was inclosed in KLÉBER's official dispatch to the Directory. Undoubtedly KLÉBER knew his chief too well, to expect that he would tell his own story with fidelity at Paris.

THERE ARE NO PRIVATE LETTERS\*. The state in which the Army is described to be, will, perhaps, sufficiently account for this circumstance. It was not so, while they had yet hope.

Never did the Public in this Country, nor, perhaps, did the World, receive information more interesting and important than is communicated in these papers. Never was there a moment in the affairs of this Country, or of the World, at which such information could have been received so opportunely.

The lesson, which is to be derived from these papers, affords a full confirmation of the observations which were offered to the Public, in former periods of the Egyptian Expedition; though accompanied, in many respects, with different sensations.

The Army of Egypt, in the outset of its enterprize, or in the full course of its sanguinary and impious career;—the Army of Egypt, while it was yet flushed with recent carnage, and intoxicated with the hopes of continued success;—the Army of Egypt, while its collective character and conduct were identified with the character and conduct of its commander;

\* By this is meant, no letters from individuals in the army to private persons in France. The letter of General DUGUA to the Director Barras is, technically speaking, a *private* letter; as it is not written by Dugua, nor addressed to Barras, in an official capacity; but it is written wholly upon public subjects to a public man; and is indeed one of the most important documents of the whole collection.



—while confident in *his* fortunes, and fierce in *his* name; while party to *his* cruelties, *his* blasphemies, and *his* frauds;—it was surely impossible to look at the Army of Egypt, in these situations, without abhorrence; or to speak of it in any other language than that of indignation.

The publication of the former collections of letters from Egypt was, therefore, naturally and justly calculated to hold up to general detestation the whole scope and aim, the whole principle and conduct, of the Egyptian Expedition\*.

Every observation that was added to those publications was directed, justly and necessarily directed, to awaken and keep alive the attention of the World to the gradual but certain progress of that devoted Army from infamy to ruin;—to their progress from the triumphant anticipation of the miseries which they were so gayly preparing for others,—to the full consummation of them upon their own heads;—their progress from the hour in which they deluged the streets of Alexandria with the blood of its unresisting inhabitants, in order to “strike terror†” into their opponents,—to that in which they should be rotting under its walls, an example to “strike terror” into those who justify and applaud them;—from the moment when they were shouting in the train of BONAPARTE, as the leader who was to conduct them to riches, to power, and to fame;—to that, when gazing after his departing sail, from the shore on which he had left them to perish, they should pursue him with execrations as a fugitive and a traitor†.

If such was the course of contemplation, to which public attention was excited, perhaps it may now appear, that public attention was not excited in vain: and those who, at the time, were most loud in blaming the rashness or exaggeration of these predictions, must now be struck and confounded by the fullness and accuracy of their accomplishment.

With those who at the time believed the prophecy, and did not disguise that they wished it to be fulfilled; with those (in other words) whose feelings were warm, and whose wishes were confident for the interests of their own Country, of her most valuable dependencies, and of her Allies, this result must produce very different sensations: yet not even in their minds those of unmixed triumph and exultation. No:—With the circumstances of the Army itself, the sentiments which it excited are in some degree changed.

Proud and powerful, with BONAPARTE at its head, and advancing under his guidance, to the perpetration of the most atrocious crimes, the Army has hitherto been necessarily involved with its Commander in one common sentiment of aversion and horror. Hitherto it has been impossible to dis-

\* If ever these sentiments and this language admitted of variation—it was only when abhorrence was mingled with ridicule, and the tone of indignation softened into contempt, at the contemplation of those unwilling martyrs to a curiosity not their own,—the unhappy but unregretted *Savans*. It was indeed a relief to turn for a moment from the disgusting repetition of crimes and barbarities, which disgraced the military character of the Expedition, to the boasts or wailings of kidnapped philosophy, and the rants and blunders of vagabond *virtu*.

† Intercepted Correspondence, part I. page 132.

‡ Intercepted Correspondence, part I. Introduction, p. xviii.

criminate between those who planned, and those who executed, the bloody work of desolation. Together, they constituted one great engine for the ravage and destruction of an unoffending Country;—together, they formed one great object for the fear and the hatred of mankind.

But the hour of discrimination is now come. The object of our contemplation now divides itself, into the Guilt which has fled from punishment, and the Misery which it has basely left behind to expiate its enormities.

The Army of Egypt, deserted by its Commander, resolves itself into a multitude of betrayed and devoted outcasts:—in the contemplation and commiseration of whose individual sufferings, our remembrance of the crimes of which they have been the instruments is lost in our indignation at the treachery of which they are the victims.

It is not, therefore, for the purpose of triumphing over fallen wickedness;—it is not for the purpose of pointing out the weighty and dreadful retribution, under which the perpetrators of such unheard-of injustice and cruelty are now suffering calamities, proportioned to those which they inflicted—(though that triumph were natural and justifiable;—though the lesson resulting from that retribution be awful and salutary): but it is to objects of more immediate concern, and more practical utility, that the attention of the Public is now called.

The purpose and the effect of this Publication is, to paint from facts which cannot be controverted,—from confessions of his own, which cannot be mistaken or disguised,—the personal character of a Man; with whose personal conduct (by a singular dispensation of Providence) is for a time involved the destiny, not, as heretofore, of an Army, but of a great and powerful Nation: to whose personal dispositions,—but for the wisdom, the firmness, and the magnanimity of the Government of this Country, might, at the present moment, have been subjected the destiny of England; and therewith that of Europe, and of the World.

Let Englishmen here learn *from himself* what reliance is to be placed on his engagements: and let them recollect that **THIS IS THE MAN** who has recently required of *their* SOVEREIGN to trust implicitly to *his* individual sincerity, and to repose unlimited confidence in his individual professions:—Let them here look for the traces of his justice, his lenity and forbearance, in the grounds of his claims upon Egypt, and in his treatment of its inhabitants: and then let them recollect, that **THIS IS THE MAN** who claims credit to himself, and to himself almost exclusively, for his rigid observance of the rights of nations, and for his regard for the “happiness of families\* 1”—Let them here read the avowal of his Egyptian Councillors, that it is the settled maxim of his political school, that “*negotiations should be opened with England, PURELY TO GAIN TIME; and concessions made, WITH A VIEW OF RESUMING THEM AT THE FIRST FAVOURABLE OPPORTUNITY †*”—and then let them recollect that, on the issue of *such* a negotiation, **THIS MAN** would fain have persuaded them to commit the interests and honour of their Country!

Fortunately, the Government of this Country has been actuated by wiser and firmer councils: and the spirit and good sense of a brave and

\* See Bonaparte's Letter to the King.

† See Poussielgue's Letter in the following Collection. No. XIII.

generous People will not disavow them. They have wisely refused to pledge all their hopes of lasting and honourable Peace, upon the *sincerity* of One whose course has been *fraud*,—upon the *humanity* of One, whose business has been *blood*,—upon the *steadiness* and *consistency* of One, whose element is *revolution*;—they have not hastily consented to hazard so sacred a trust upon such insufficient and uninviting security;—they have not thought it reasonable, in a matter of such fearful moment, to believe at once *against* all past example, and to presume at once *against* all probable inference; but have at least determined to wait until that example and that inference shall be contradicted by “*EXPERIENCE AND THE EVIDENCE OF FACTS*.”

Those, indeed, who raise at all times and under all circumstances, a senseless and indiscriminate clamour for peace,—not because they love peace, but because they delight in clamour,—are not to be silenced by the demonstration, that treaty at this moment must have been insecure. Those who, if they wish for Peace, wish for it,—not because it would bring with it the honourable and certain termination of their Country's struggles for security and independence; but because it would afford rest and breathing-time to the principles of the French Revolution, exhausted (as some may think) in their means of present mischief; who trust that an interval of repose would give to those principles the freshness and vigour which they have now lost; and, by procuring oblivion of their past enormities, would enable them to renew their operations, and to re-assemble their afflicted and scattered partizans;—no wonder, if persons of this persuasion should resent the just exposure of that Man's principles and conduct,—with whose fortune the fate of the Revolution is associated, and in whose person its power is enthroned.

They believe that Peace made, at this moment, with BONAPARTE, would tend to confirm and consolidate his yet unsettled authority:—in that view he proposed Peace. They know that he has pledged himself to the Nation, over whom he has usurped dominion, to procure Peace for them without delay: in the hope of persuading them,—perhaps having in vain presumption persuaded himself,—that his ascendant was as uncontrollable, and his genius as imposing, throughout Europe, as he has found it for a time in Egypt, and (since he fled from Egypt) in France.—

They know that a refusal to treat, at his first bidding, will of itself have taught France to appreciate more justly the estimation in which his character is held. They know that this refusal will be justified, in the eye of France itself, by such irrefragable proofs, as these papers contain, of the habitual insincerity of his professions, of his selfish and unprincipled ambition:—and they tremble for the shock which such a conviction may give, not only to all reliance on his consideration abroad, but to all respect for his authority at home.—

No wonder, therefore, that an outcry should be raised by those who worshipped the Revolution, in all its successive stages, and who now worship BONAPARTE, as the Representative of the Revolution, against the detection and disgrace which they understand to be impending over him. No wonder, that they should resort to every argument, even to arguments the most inconsistent with each other, to create a prejudice

\* See His Majesty's Declaration, in answer to Bonaparte's Letter.



against the publication of these Letters, or to discredit their authenticity.

They began with the latter of these attempts; but they presently felt that it was hopeless. The Letters speak too plainly for themselves; even if all doubts upon this subject had not been removed by their publication, in the first instance, by the authority of Government.

Next, however, nothing daunted by its direct contradiction with their original supposition, they resort to the argument, that, *if genuine, they ought not to have been published*.\*

The publication of them, say these clear-headed reasoners, is "*a breach of confidence*."—The idea is logically conceived; and the words are fancifully chosen.—"*Confidence*" then, it seems, implies not something entrusted by a Friend but something wrested from an Enemy: it relates, not to what has been communicated voluntarily, under the express or implied promise of secrecy; but to what has been rightfully seized, by open force, in spite of resistance from the apprehension of disclosure.

Or perhaps in some chapter of those new Ethicks, which prescribe the duties that the rest of mankind owe to FRANCE, it may be laid down as a principle, that the interception of the correspondence of an enemy (*when that enemy happens to be FRANCE*),—instead of giving to the interceptors the right and advantage of using the information which they thus obtain, ought to excite in their minds the tenderest feelings of sympathy, and to impose on them the most delicate duties of friendship!

These doctrines the jurists of Jacobinism may discuss and settle at their leisure.

In the mean time, perhaps, they may be forced to acknowledge that it is, after all, France herself who will derive the chief benefit from this publication.

If to the people of England it be indeed of no small importance to be informed of the real nature and extent of the machinations of their enemies; to see laid open before them the dangers which they have escaped, and the deceptions against which they have been guarded: Is it not of

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\* It is not at all wonderful, that Gentlemen of a Jacobin way of thinking should have such an unconquerable aversion to the publication of INTERCEPTED LETTERS. They must yet remember, with horror, the confusion which was occasioned by the publication of Mr. STONE's Letter to Dr. PRIESTLEY ("patriot, and saint, and sage"), which was intercepted by one of our Cruizers, in a vessel bound from France to America, and which developed (*as the friends of both Parties may recollect*) some of the most confidential principles of that branch of the new school, so happily established in this Country. But even this act of unparalleled "*breach of confidence*" is little, to what they must be prepared to expect by and by. They will hear, with dismay, that at SERINGAPATAM, taken by storm, the Palace of Tippoo Sulthan was inhumanly violated, its most private recesses fraudulently explored, and his most intimate and confidential drawers and pigeon-holes disingenuously ransacked; and that the whole of the Secret Papers, found there and intended for his own most private and particular eye, containing his CORRESPONDENCE with FRANCE, and with the societies of Frenchmen, established on the true Jacobin model, in India, and his PLANS and ENGAGEMENTS for the SUBVERSION OF THE BRITISH POWER in that Quarter of the World, is intended for immediate publication: an instance of perfidy and "*breach of confidence*" that throws the present quite into the shade.

still greater moment to the people of France, that they should know the extent of the delusion which has been practised upon *them*, and the true character of the man by whom they have been so deceived? Have not the people of France a still deeper interest in the disclosure of the true state of that favourite Army; which they are even now taught to believe in so prosperous a condition, as to want no comfort of life, but an *Opera*\*, and to need no reinforcement, but of *Prostitutes*†?

When, from the perusal of these letters, the people of that country shall be enabled to judge what has really been the fate, and what are now the hopes of so many thousands of their countrymen; and to compare with what they now learn, the representations with which they have hitherto been amused; it may perhaps occur to them to ask whether the hands from which they have received so faithful an account of their Army, be those into which they can most safely entrust the administration of their Empire.

When they see with what unfeigned reluctance the General tears himself from his faithful and affectionate followers; how considerably he spares them the pain of exchanging adieus; with how much caution and foresight he calculates the probable scale and progress of destruction to those whom he quits with so much regret, and "in the midst of whom he still remains in heart and spirit," (though forced, for certain reasons, to be corporeally absent "for a moment";) how tenderly he recommends the negotiation for their safety to be begun, without loss of time, so soon as "fifteen hundred shall have || died fairly by the plague ("over and above," says this sturdy arithmetician, "those who perish daily in the field:");—seeing this, they may perhaps pause to consider, whether he who shews such anxious care for those whom he acknowledges as "his children," is likely to extend the same paternal solicitude towards those whom he claims for his subjects.

The people of France will not fail to recollect, that the Expedition to Egypt was exclusively the project of BONAPARTE ¶.

They may, perhaps, therefore reasonably infer, from his conduct with regard to that Expedition, what is to be expected from his attachment to the Revolution, many parts of which are also peculiarly his own.

\* See Bonaparte's Letter in the following Collection, p. 14.

† One of the first acts of BONAPARTE's provisional administration (as related in the Paris Papers) was a *hot press* at the *Palais Royal* for a number of ladies of this description. Three hundred hands (able or ordinary) were thus procured; and put up, as was then understood, to be dispatched by the first convoy to Egypt. This account of their destination has indeed since been contradicted in some of the French Papers; but whether by those in the confidence of the *ANNEE SEPT* is still matter of mystery.

‡ See Bonaparte's Address to his Soldiers, p. 9.

|| See Bonaparte's Letter, p. 12.

§ See Bonaparte's Letter, p. 13.

¶ So *Reubell*, so *Lépaux*, so the indubitable *Talleyrand*, has assured them; *Reubell*, in his defence before the Council of Ancients; *Lépaux*, in a book published at the same time; and *Talleyrand*, in the vindication of himself, which appeared in the French Papers. They all *concur* in attributing the Project of the Expedition to Bonaparte. On either of these testimonies, singly, it might perhaps not be fair to fasten such a charge upon him: but, if it be false, fortunately for his character, he has *Talleyrand* at hand, and can presently force him to retract it.

Of the Expedition he has assumed to himself all the merit of the plan, and monopolized all the glory of its execution ; so far as the Plan has been successful ; so far as the execution has been splendid : and in pursuit of these praises to himself, he has led his Army into unprofitable dangers, and finally left them to a ruin which he has refused to share. Of the Revolution, he helped to establish with his\* cannon that form, which he has now overturned with his bayonets. And when the time of trial to this new fabric shall arrive ;—it may strike the people of France, perhaps, that he who abandoned an Expedition of his own planning, as soon as its Catastrophe appeared unavoidable, might again give the last blow to a Constitution of his own erecting, whenever he should see reason to apprehend that he might otherwise be crushed himself in its fall.

They may recollect, perhaps, that the followers of BONAPARTE have not as yet been admitted, in the crisis of danger and distress, into a fair participation of his boasted *fortune* ; and that the great effort of his prudence, and the best resource of his genius, has hitherto consisted in *sacrificing THEM, to extricate HIMSELF.*

And when, at length, these things shall force themselves, as they must, upon the observation of those who are now awed by his power, or dazzled by his name ; and when they see that these things are known and felt throughout Europe ; may they not think it matter of serious doubt, whether that name and that power be indeed (as they have been taught to believe) destined to consolidate the fortunes of France ;—to heal the wounds, and calm the agitations, of her long series of Revolutions ; to efface the memory of her multiplied crimes and sufferings ; to re-establish her station among the Nations of the Earth ; and to restore to her, once again, tranquillity at home, and peace abroad ?

May they not reasonably doubt whether the qualities of BONAPARTE, such as they are here recorded, and the Government of which *they* constitute the sole recommendation and security, are fitted to so high and arduous a duty ?

And *then*,—ye implicit and unwearied admirers of every possible French constitution,—say, does this last work of “ *human wisdom and integrity* ” promise to be immortal ?

What think you, ye Jacobins of Europe, will not your Idol totter on his throne ?

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\* On the 13th Vendémiaire (Oct. 1795), at the period of the last revolution but *two*,—no : but *three* : when Bonaparte, under the direction of Barras, commanded the artillery at Paris, and mowed down whole groupes of the people of the Sections. Bonaparte is said to have been the only military man who could be found to undertake this work of slaughter. It was the origin of his promotion ; the first foundation of his greatness. Undoubtedly, the recollection of it must render him dear to the People of Paris. The friends and relatives of those who fell in the massacre of that day, must feel their remembrance of those victims pleasingly excited, as often as they are called upon to troop after the heels of the FIRST CONSUL to the Opera, or the Institute ;—and to admire, in a morning, his blue coat, and white pantaloons ; and, in the evening, the white coat, with the blue ones : Magnificence cheaply purchased by the blood of “ *mon bon peuple de Paris*.”



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# Copies of Original Letters, etc.

## PART III.

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Liberty.

No. I.

Equality.

Head Quarters, Cairo, October 9, 1799.

Kléber, *Commander in Chief, to the Executive Directory.*

THE Citizen Barras\* being particularly known to me by his fidelity, his extreme attachment to the Government, his love for the Republic, and for truth; I thought, Citizens Directors, that I could not fix on a more proper person to send home with my first dispatches to you, out of cipher. I have ordered him to throw them overboard†, in the event of his being closely pursued by the enemy; and he is sufficiently acquainted with their contents to be able to give you a verbal account of them, if it should be necessary. I entreat you to place the same confidence in him which I have been induced to do, from observing the uprightness of his conduct since he has been in this country.

Health and respect,

(Signed) KLÉBER.

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No. II.

Head Quarters, Alexandria, August 23, 1799.

Bonaparte, *Commander in Chief, to the ARMY.*

IN consequence of the news from Europe, I have determined to return immediately to France. I leave the command of the army to General Kléber: they shall hear from me speedily:—this is all I can say to them at present. *It grieves me to the heart to part from the brave men to whom I am so tenderly attached; but it will be only for an instant; and the*

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\* Cousin to the ci-devant Director of that name.

† This was done, but some of the El Vincejo's men instantly jumped into the boat, and saved them. As a slight specimen of the advantages which the French have derived from this famous Expedition, it should be mentioned that the advice boat which carried these letters had 105 poor wretches stone blind on board her, from the Army of Egypt.

General I leave at their head is in full possession of the confidence of the Government and of mine \*.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.

By order of the Commander in Chief, and of the General of Division,  
Chief of the Staff,

(Signed) ALEX. BERTHIER.

A true copy, (Signed) SONNET, Adjutant-General.

A true copy, (Signed) LE ROY.

*Note.* This address to the army was not delivered by Bonaparte. It was enclosed in the letter to Kleber, to be read to them *after he was gone!*

### No. III.

*Alexandria, August 22, 1799.*

Bonaparte, *Commander in Chief, to General Kléber.*

ANNEXED to this, Citizen General, you will find an order for you to take the command of the army. My constant apprehensions lest the English fleet should again appear on the coast, compel me to hasten my voyage by two or three days.

I take with me Generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossi, and Marmont; Citizen Monge, and Citizen Bertholet.

Enclosed you will find the English and Francfort papers† up to the 10th of June. You will see by them, that we have lost Italy! that Mantua, Udin, and Tortona, are in a state of blockade. I have some grounds to flatter myself that the first of these places will hold out to the end of November‡; and I trust, if fortune smiles upon me, to be in Europe before the beginning of October.

\* The veracity of this renowned General is now no longer problematical; it can astonish no one, therefore, to hear him say that Kléber is "in full possession of his confidence;" though it appears from Kléber's own letters, that he possessed not a particle of it; nor knew of his intentions of running away till two days after his flight!

† It would seem from this (and indeed the whole tenour of this correspondence proves it) that the Directory gave themselves as little trouble about Bonaparte, as if he had not obliged them by sacrificing his gallant army to their common views. But for these papers (which were most probably given to him by some unsuspecting British tar, who had better have kept them himself), he would have been ignorant of what was doing in Europe. He refers Kléber to no information from the Directory; HE MENTIONS NO ORDERS FOR HIS RECALL—which would have been a sufficient plea, and which he would not have failed to urge, if he had received any—but bottoms the whole upon the accidental acquisition of a few newspapers! Even in his farewell address to the army, he gives no other reason for his return but the *news*; though such a circumstance must have been to them a most cruel insult; as their presence in Europe must have been full as necessary as his own.

‡ Bonaparte may be pardoned for this conjecture, formed from an estimate of the time which it took him to reduce it, in his boasted campaigns. Mantua was invested by him for the first time on the 4th of June 1796; it did not surrender till the 2d of February in the following year, a space of eight months; nor then to the fire of the besiegers, but to that which no courage, nor obstinacy, can contend—an absolute want of food! Compare this with the recovery of the same town, in the present campaign. It fell, with a garrison of thirteen thousand men, after a close and vigorous siege of only eleven days! Indeed, if the Austro-

You will also find enclosed, a cipher for your correspondence with the Government ; and another, for your communications with me.

I entreat you to dispatch Gimot some time in the month of October \*, together with the baggage which I have left at Cairo, and my domestics. I should, however, have no particular objection to your taking as many of them as may suit you into your own service.

It is the present intention of Government, that General Desaix † should set out for Europe in November next, unless something of consequence should arise here to detain him.

The COMMISSION OF THE ARTS shall return to France on board a flag of truce, which you will demand for this purpose, conformably to the late cartel, some time in the month of November, immediately after they have completed the object of their mission. They are at present engaged in putting a finishing hand to it, by an examination of Upper Egypt. Nevertheless, if you think that any of them will be of service to you, you may put them *in requisition* without scruple ‡ !!!

The Effendi who was made prisoner at Aboukir, is set out for Damietta. I have already written to you to send him to Cyprus : he takes with him a letter for the Grand Vizier, of which I enclose you a copy ||.

Russian campaign in Italy be compared with those of Bonaparte, the latter dwindle into insignificance. With an immense army, powerfully reinforced by the discontented and vicious of all nations, whom he attached to his standard by the lure of novelty and indiscriminate plunder, Bonaparte over-ran Italy in two years : let it be remembered, however, that all its fortresses (with the exception of Mantua) were pusillanimously or insidiously delivered to him, before he had even captured the paltry town of Ceva, the first garrison in Piedmont ; while the Austro-Russians have reconquered the same country in the short space of nine months, with the addition of Alexandria, Tortona, &c. and the almost impregnable fortresses of Coni and Turin ; the last of which had been treacherously seized by the execrable Joubert.

This, though pretty generally known, is mentioned here, for the exclusive benefit of Bonaparte's Jacobin admirers ; who, reduced to despise, with the rest of the world, his legislative talents, pretend to found his claims to empire on his *rapid and unrivalled* victories !

\* The General had forgotten that he promised the soldiers (whom he took leave of with such heart-felt regret) that he would return to them forthwith (*momentanément*).

† This is the person who, according to the joint reports of Bonaparte and himself, has annihilated Mourad Bey, and his handful of Mameloucs, several times over. It will be seen presently, however, that they are still alive and merry ; preparing to do as much for him in their turn. Desaix was looked upon in France as one of the best officers in the service.

‡ Would not one imagine this humane *savant-driver* was talking of camels or buffaloes, instead of the men whose immortal labours in Egypt were to astonish the world, and illustrate France with a full display of the recondite lore of Hermes Trismegistus ? Put them *in requisition* without scruple ! Unfortunate beings ! this is the very thing that he had before done to them in France !

This paragraph is highly worthy of the serious consideration of the Jacobins : since of all the brilliant qualities of Bonaparte, none (with the exception of his humanity) has been so long and so loudly dwelt upon by them, as his singular love of learning, and learned men !

|| See No. XIV.



The arrival of the Brest fleet at Toulon, and of the Cadiz fleet at Carthage, leaves no kind of doubt of the possibility of transmitting to Egypt the muskets, sabres, pistols, balls, &c. of which you stand in need, and of which I am provided with a very exact enumeration; together with a sufficient number of recruits to supply the losses of our two campaigns. Government itself, I presume, will, by that conveyance, acquaint you with its intentions: as for myself, both in my public and my private capacity, I promise to take every measure for enabling you to hear frequently from France\*.

If, by a series of the most extraordinary events, none of these attempts should succeed, and you should neither receive reinforcements, nor intelligence from France by May next; and if this year, in spite of all your precautions, the plague should break out in Egypt, and *carry off more than fifteen hundred of the troops*†—a considerable loss, in addition to that which the events of the war will daily occasion—I think that you ought not then to venture upon another campaign, and that you are sufficiently justified in concluding a peace with the Ottoman Porte; even though the evacuation of Egypt should be the leading article. It will merely be necessary for you to postpone the execution of it (if such a thing be possible) till the period of a general peace.

No one, Citizen General, has better means of judging of the importance of Egypt to France, than yourself. The Turkish empire, menaced with ruin on every side, is crumbling to pieces at this moment; and the evacuation of Egypt on our part, would be so much the more unfortunate, as we should be sure to see, ere long, this fine province fall into the hands of some other European powers.

The intelligence of the good or ill fortune which may attend the Republic in Europe, will, of course, have its due influence in determining your future measures.

If the Porte should reply to the overtures I have made for peace, before my letters from France can reach you, it will be, in that case, necessary for you to declare, that you have all the powers with which I was entrusted.

Enter then upon the negotiation; *adhere strenuously and constantly to the assertion which I have advanced, that France never had the least idea of* TAKING EGYPT FROM THE GRAND SEIGNIOR!!!

\* After noticing the various wants of the French army, the reader may be curious to know what Bonaparte has done in either of his *capacities* to relieve them. It may be told in three words. He has raked the kennels of Paris for a number of prostitutes more pestilential than the plague, to send them; and he has *put in requisition* a few miserable companies of strolling players, who may probably arrive time enough to see the curtain drop for ever on the tragi-comedy of his expedition.

† The cool calculation of 1500 men, which this “hope and consolation” of the rancorous “school of humanity” thinks a reasonable quantity to die of the plague, is chiefly noticed here, as furnishing a tolerable criterion for estimating the numbers that fell in the former season. As an useless sacrifice of so many hundred human beings, it is scarce worth mention in the history of a man who has spilled more blood wantonly than any commander of ancient or modern times.

Require the Ottoman Porte to separate itself from the Coalition, to grant us the free commerce of the Black Sea, to set at liberty all the French in confinement, and lastly, to agree to a suspension of hostilities for six months, that there may be a sufficient time for the mutual exchange of ratifications.

Supposing, however, that you should find yourself in such circumstances as you conceive make it necessary to *conclude* a treaty with the Porte; you must then make that power understand that you cannot execute your part of it, before it be ratified (at home); and that, according to the usual practice of all nations, the interval between the signing and ratifying of a treaty, is always considered as a suspension of hostilities.

You are acquainted, Citizen General, with my way of thinking respecting the interior policy of Egypt. Act in whatever manner you please, the Christians will still be our friends; it will be necessary, however, to prevent them from growing too insolent, lest the Turks should conceive the same fanatic prejudice against us as against them, which would destroy every possibility of a reconciliation: this fanaticism must at all events be laid asleep, until we have an opportunity of extirpating it entirely. By gaining the good opinion of the principal Sheiks at Cairo, we shall secure that of all Egypt; and of all the chiefs which its inhabitants may rally under, there are none less to be apprehended by us than the Sheik, who are all timorous, unacquainted with arms, and, like all other priests, know how to inspire the people with fanaticism, without being fanatic themselves.

With respect to the fortifications, I consider Alexandria and El Arisch as the two keys of Egypt. I had once an idea of forming, during the approaching winter, several redoubts of palm-tree; two from Sallich to Casties, two from Casties to El Arisch: of these last, one was to be placed on the spot where General Menou discovered a spring of tolerable water.

Brigadier-general Sanson, commander of the corps of engineers, and Brigadier-general Sougis, commander of the artillery, will furnish you with the necessary details of their respective departments.

Citizen Poussielgue has had the sole management of the finances; I have found him extremely active, and in every respect a person of merit; he begins to have some insight into the chaos of the administration of this country. It was my intention, if nothing occurred to prevent me, to attempt this winter a *new* system of taxation, which would, by degrees, relieve us from our present dependance on the Copts: before you undertake it, however, I advise you to make it the subject of long and deliberate meditation; it is safer to begin an operation of this nature a little too late, than a little too soon.

Our ships of war will certainly make their appearance this winter, either at Alexandria, Brulos, or Damietta. You must have a battery and a signal-tower at Brulos. Endeavour to get together five or six hundred Mameloucs, in such a manner that, when the French fleet arrives, you may be able to lay your hands upon them at the same instant of time, either at Cairo or in the other provinces, and send them off immediately to France\*. If you

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\* It is impossible to conceive a scheme of blacker or more diabolical perfidy than Bonaparte here plans for Kléber. Five or six hundred innocent people, living

cannot procure Mameloucs, such Arab hostages, Cheiks el Beled as may then be in custody, no matter on what account, will answer the end as well. These people, landed in France, and detained there for a year or two, will contemplate the grandeur of the nation; they will acquire, in some degree, our manners and our language, and when they return to Egypt, will prove to us so many partisans.

I have already repeatedly written for a company of comedians; I will take particular care that they shall be sent\*. This appears to me an article of the utmost consequence, not only for the army, but for the purpose of effecting something like a change in the moral habits of the country.

The important situation of Commander in Chief, which is now devolved upon you, will afford you ample opportunities of displaying those talents with which nature has endowed you. The interest taken in every thing which passes here, is active and lively; and the consequences resulting from it will be immense, whether considered with respect to commerce or to civilization. This is assuredly the epoch from whence revolutions of the most extraordinary nature will take their date.

Accustomed to look for the recompence of the toils and difficulties of life in the opinion of posterity, I abandon Egypt with the deepest regret †!

without suspicion or fear under the protection of the French, are to be torn from their country, their families, and friends, and hurried off to France under a pretence equally absurd and iniquitous.

Fortunately, Bonaparte left a man behind him but little inclined to be the agent of his villany. How must this gallant and discerning soldier have felt the insult here offered him? How must he have smiled with contempt at this mixture of idiotism and frenzy? this order for him to exasperate the country by an act of wanton barbarity, at the time he was instructed to treat about leaving it in peace! Bonaparte allows that those Mamelouc missionaries could not finish their Parisian education in less than a year or two, and yet he has just before granted a delay of only six months to conclude the agreement which is to shut the French out of Egypt for ever.

With respect to the Arab hostages, Cheiks, or any thing else instead of Mameloucs; if such a motley crew were not designed to gratify his own vanity, they could only serve to remind the Parisians of the ever-memorable procession of the "Orator of the human race," Anacharsis Clootz. At any rate, the idea of bringing about a great change in the country by their means, is completely ridiculous, and truly worthy of the man who conceived it.

\* This is the only one of all his numerous promises that Bonaparte has condescended to recollect. He thought of it, we see, in Egypt; and, not to disparage his talents for invention, might be indebted for the idea to Voltaire, who advised us (not seriously, it must be confessed) to send a few opera-dancers to St. Vincent's, to soften and subdue the Caribs.

† What have we here? A mortified Carthusian? Meek and lowly servant of an unambitious republic, he makes no boastful claims to the admiration of the present age; he fights battles, he overturns states, he wades through human blood, from the shores of Genoa to the Adriatic; he flies from one ravaged quarter of the globe to lay waste another, without motive or end;—and he tells all this in a jargon that Captain Bobadil would have blushed at. What then? His toil, like virtue, is its own reward, and he aspires only to the grateful notice of posterity! All this is as perfectly true, as that he abandoned Egypt *with regret*, or that Kléber believed him when he said so.



The honour and interests of my country, duty\*, and the extraordinary events which have recently taken place there; these, and these alone, have determined me to hazard a passage to Europe, through the midst of the enemy's squadrons. In heart and in spirit I shall still be in the midst of you! Your victories will be as dear to me as any in which I may be personally engaged; and I shall look upon that day of my life as ill employed, in which I shall not do something for the army of which I leave you the command; and for the consolidation of the magnificent establishment, the foundation of which is so recently laid.

The army I entrust to your care, is entirely composed of MY OWN CHILDREN. I have never ceased, even in the midst of their most trying difficulties and dangers, to receive proofs of their attachment†; endeavour to preserve them still in those sentiments for me. This is due to the particular esteem and friendship I entertain for you, and to the unfeigned affection I feel for them!

(Signed)

BONAPARTE.

A true Copy,

KLÉBER.

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 No. IV.

Liberty.

Equality.

French Republic.

*Head Quarters, Cairo, October 7th, 1799.*Kléber ‡, *Commander in Chief, to the Directory.*

THE Commander in Chief, Bonaparte, quitted this country on the morning of the 23d ult. without saying a word of his intention to any

\* *Obéissance* in the original. This is the only word which he ventures to hazard respecting a call to return, and this is weak and insignificant. If he had been ordered to France, the simple truth would have been soon told; but it is evident he was not; he had other reasons for his flight: the measure of his cruelties in Egypt was now full, and vengeance was approaching with hasty strides. The attempt to blind Kléber by an ambiguous word, was as vain as it was foolish; that General saw his motive, and has recorded it.

† Of what materials must this man's heart be made? Even Satan is represented by Milton as bursting into *such tears as angels shed*, at the recollection of what he had brought on his followers, yet—*faithful how they stood*. But Bonaparte seems absolutely incapable of any impressions of pity or remorse; he is an anomalous being, such as neither history nor fiction has yet dared to exhibit.

‡ This is the first letter that has yet appeared from Kléber, and it is such as might have been expected from one of his distinguished reputation. It is sensible, and manly; forming a complete contrast in every respect to the letter of Bonaparte, of which it is a shrewd and impartial critique.

To point out the superior penetration and good sense of Kléber, would be superfluous; but it may not be so to compare his manner of proceeding with Bonaparte, to Bonaparte's treatment of Brueys. That unfortunate man, after being reluctantly detained on the coast of Egypt by Bonaparte's express and reiterated orders,

person whatever. He had appointed me to meet him at Rosetta on the subsequent day! (the 24th.) I found nothing there but his dispatches. Unable to divine whether the General has had the good fortune to reach Toulon, I think it incumbent on me to send you a copy of the letter by which he transferred to me the command of the army, as also of another which he had addressed to the Grand Vizier at *Constantinople*, although he knew perfectly well, that this officer was already arrived at Damascus\*.

My first cares have been directed to obtain an accurate knowledge of the present condition of the army.

You know, Citizen Directors, and you have it in your power to procure the requisite statements; you know, I say, the actual strength of the army at its arrival in Egypt: it is reduced a full half!—and we occupy all the capital points of the great triangle, from the Cataracts to El Arisch, from El Arisch to Alexandria, and from Alexandria again to the Cataracts; meanwhile it is no longer a question, as it once was, of contending with a few hordes of dispirited Mameloucs; but of resisting and combating the united efforts of three great powers, the Porte, England, and Russia.

The absolute want of arms, of gunpowder, of cannon and musket-balls, presents a picture no less alarming than the prodigious and rapid diminution of our numbers. Our attempts to establish a foundry have failed of success; and the manufactory of powder, which we set on foot at Ilhoda, has not hitherto kept pace in any degree with our expectations; in all probability it never will. Add to this, that the repairing of our small arms proceeds but slowly; and that, to give the necessary activity to these various undertakings, money and means, of which we have neither, are absolutely indispensable.

THE TROOPS ARE NAKED—and this privation of clothing is the more calamitous, as it is perfectly ascertained in this country, to be one of the most active causes of the dysenteries and ophthalmies which constantly prevail here. The first, in particular, has operated with an alarming effect this season, on bodies already weakened and exhausted by fatigue. The members of the Board of Health remark (and never fail to mention it in their reports), that although the army is so much diminished, the number on the sick list is considerably larger this year, than at the same period of the last.

General Bonaparte, previous to his departure, had, it is true, given orders for new clothing the army: but for this, as well as for a great many other

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was no sooner dead, than Bonaparte published, in the face of all Europe, that he had fallen a victim to his own obstinacy, and contempt of authority!—though the remonstrances of Brueys, and Bonaparte's rejection of them, both existed, to convict him of a base, cowardly, and malicious calumny. While Kléber, with the calm dignity of a soldier, and a man of honour, indulging in no random speculations, patiently reviews the General's statement, which he transmits to the Directory, with his own remarks, always intelligent and convincing;—that they may be enabled to judge of the facts on which they are founded, and the opinions from which they are drawn.

\* It is not easy to account for this vagary of Bonaparte's: the most natural way of obtaining his purpose, would certainly have been to look for the Vizier where he was sure to be found. Kléber apparently feels some resentment at this trifling with the miseries of the army, by a feeble attempt at procrastination.

projects,

projects, he contented himself *with the mere orders*\*: the poverty of the finances (which is a new obstacle to be combated) reduced him, doubtless, to the necessity of adjourning the execution of this useful design.

Now I have mentioned the finances, I feel it my duty to say somewhat more on the subject.

General Bonaparte exhausted the extraordinary resources within a few months after our arrival! He levied at that time as extensive a military contribution as the country could possibly support! To have recourse a second time to this expedient, now that we are surrounded with enemies from without, would only pave the way for an insurrection the first favourable moment.

Notwithstanding all this, Bonaparte, at quitting us, did not leave behind him a SINGLE SOUS in the military chest, nor any thing capable of being turned into money! He left, on the contrary, a debt of near ten millions, more than a whole year's income in the present state of things: the pay of the army alone is in arrear full four millions.

The present state of the inundation makes it impossible to recover the deficiencies of the year just expired, and which, if it were not so, would scarce answer the expences of a month: we cannot, therefore, enter again on the collection of the taxes till the end of November; and even then it is clear to me, that we shall not be in a condition to attend sufficiently to it, because we shall have our hands full of fighting. In a word, the Nile being very low this year, many provinces deprived of the inundation, will claim the customary exemptions, to which we cannot, in common justice, object.

Every syllable, Citizen Directors, which I here advance, I can authenticate either by verbal processes, or by estimates of the different services regularly signed.

Although Egypt is to all appearance tranquil, it is nothing less than in a state of submission; the people are restless and uneasy, and in spite of all we can do to the contrary, persist in looking upon us as the enemies of their property: their hearts are incessantly open to the hopes of a favourable change.

The Mameloucs are dispersed, but not destroyed. Mourad Bey is still in Upper Egypt, with a body of men sufficiently numerous to find constant

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\* Kléber has fallen into a slight mistake here. Bonaparte did not absolutely content himself with ordering the clothing—no, he went farther—he set the Savans of the Egyptian Institute upon consulting what *coloured* cloth was best adapted to the climate: and these venerable sages, after discussing at great length the merits of several, of which there was not an ell in the country, ultimately fixed upon a *gris-de-lin*, of which there was still less! Nor did the General stop even here: he asserted in his dispatches that many thousand ells of this cloth (so judiciously chosen) had been delivered to the army! The readers of the Jacobin newspapers here cannot yet have forgotten their generous triumph at this incontrovertible proof of the improving condition of “the Army of the East!”

The conclusion of this paragraph is an evident sarcasm. Kléber knew that Bonaparte was as well acquainted with the state of the finances before these orders as after them. He knew too, what all the world besides knows, that they were only given to procure a momentary popularity, and carry on that system of fraud and hypocrisy with which he began, and with which he will most assuredly end.



employment for a considerable part of our forces. If we should quit him for an instant, his little army would increase with inconceivable rapidity, and he would descend the Nile and harass us at the gates of this capital, where, in spite of the most vigilant attention, they have constantly found means, to this very hour, to procure him supplies of arms and money.

Ibrahim Bey is at Gaza with about two thousand Mameloucs; and I am informed that thirty thousand men, part of the army of the Grand Vizier and Dgezzer Pasha, are also arrived at the same place. The Grand Vizier left Damascus about three weeks ago; he is at present encamped near Acre: finally, the English are masters of the Red Sea.

Such, Citizen Directors, is the situation in which General Bonaparte has left me to sustain the enormous burden of commanding the Army of the East! HE SAW THE FATAL CRISIS APPROACHING\*: your orders have not permitted him to surmount it. That such a crisis exists, his letters, his instructions, his negotiation lately set on foot, all contribute to evince; it is of public notoriety, and our enemies appear to me no less perfectly informed of it than ourselves.

"If this year," says General Bonaparte, "in spite of all our precautions, the plague should break out in Egypt, and carry off more than fifteen hundred men, &c. I then think that you ought not to venture upon another campaign, and that you are sufficiently justified in concluding a peace with the Ottoman Porte, even though the evacuation of Egypt should be the leading article," &c.

I have pointed out this passage to you, Citizen Directors, because it is characteristic in more than one point of view†; and, above all, because it clearly shews you the real situation in which I am placed. Of what consequence are fifteen hundred men, more or less, in the immense space of country which I have to defend, and against an eternal repetition of attacks?

The General further says, "Alexandria and El Arisch are the two keys of Egypt‡." El Arisch is a paltry fort, four days journey in the Desert;

\* Here is the key to Bonaparte's flight. With respect to the orders Kléber mentions, he must either speak ironically, or, which is more probable, mean to convey an idea that the insinuation couched under the word *obéissance* in Bonaparte's letter, was false, and justified by no authority from home; he puts Bonaparte and the Directory at issue upon the point; and as it must be manifest who is really culpable, it is, perhaps, fortunate for the former that his present usurpation sets him above the immediate dread of the guillotine, for an act of equal treachery and disobedience.

† The general opinion of the good sense and humanity of Kléber would be ill justified, if he had omitted to set a mark of reprobation upon the passage he has quoted: it is, indeed, characteristic of Bonaparte! It is marked with his usual contempt of human sufferings, with his lavish expenditure of blood, and with his wanton sacrifice of his followers to projects at once useless and unattainable!

It is permitted to hope, however, that the more serious views of Kléber will induce him to close the disastrous scene, though *a few less than fifteen hundred men* should be the victims of the next pestilence.

‡ The statement which follows of the real strength and importance of El Arisch, and which differs so materially from that of Bonaparte's, is corroborated by a general officer in a letter which will be found (N°. XIII.)

the prodigious difficulty of victualling it, will not allow of its being garrisoned by more than two hundred and fifty men. Six hundred Mameloucs and Arabs might, whenever they pleased, cut off all communication with Catiez; and as, when Bonaparte left us, this garrison had but a fortnight's provision in advance; just that space of time, and no more, would be sufficient to compel it to capitulate without firing a shot! The Arabs alone were capable of furnishing regular convoys of provisions through these burning deserts: but they have been *so often over-reached and defrauded*, that, far from offering us their services, they now keep aloof and conceal themselves; besides, the arrival of the Grand Vizier, who inflames their fanaticism and overwhelms them with presents, will equally tend to incline them to desert us\*.

Alexandria is by no means a fortress; it is a large intrenched camp. It was, indeed, tolerably well defended by a numerous heavy artillery; but since we lost it in the disastrous invasion of Syria, and since General Bonaparte has taken all the cannon belonging to the shipping, to complete the equipment of the two frigates with which he sailed for France, this camp can make, in fact, but a feeble resistance†.

General Bonaparte deceived himself with regard to the consequences which he expected from his victory at Aboukir. He cut to pieces‡, it is true, near nine thousand Turks who had landed there; but what is such a loss as this to a great nation, from whom we have violently torn the fairest portion of its empire, and whom religion, honour, and interest, equally stimulate to avenge its injuries, and to re-conquer what it has been thus deprived of? As a proof of what I say, this victory has not retarded for a single instant, either the preparations or the march of the Grand Vizier.

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There is no doubt of its accuracy, and it bears hard either on the veracity or the military skill of Bonaparte. The latter (of the former there are no doubts) has long been somewhat problematical; and the attentive readers of this correspondence will probably be inclined to think not much more highly of it than Kléber appears to do, or the very judicious officer, to whose strictures we allude.

\* There are two roads from Syria to Egypt; so that it is by no means necessary to pass by El Arisch. Both these roads furnish water; one of them has just been discovered.—*Note of Kléber.*

† This circumstance is not less characteristic than the one so properly pointed out by Kléber a few pages above: to provide for his own personal safety at the expense of that of the whole "Army of the East," is only a part of that narrow and selfish system on which he has always acted. But does any thing in it relish of the great general? Or can his most enthusiastic admirers see any thing that did so in his unfurnishing the only defensible place in his possession (of the importance of which he takes care to remind Kléber), for the sake of a wild and desultory expedition, he knew not where, at the hazard of leaving it an easy prey to the first enemy that might be apprized of its unprotected condition?

It is scarcely possible, on reading these and similar passages, not to call to mind the sensible exclamation of Lâcuée; "Oh! how many false reputations were acquired in Italy! and how many pedestals will now rest without statues!" *Intercepted Correspondence, Part. II. p. 133.*

‡ *Détruit.* This does not mean absolutely cut to pieces, but destroyed as a body; and indeed it appears from Bonaparte's dispatches to the Directory, that more than two thousand of those who had disembarked were prisoners. From the General's well-known talents for exaggeration, a reasonable hope might be enter-

In this state of things, what can, and what ought I to do? I think, Citizen Directors, that I should continue the negotiations entered upon by Bonaparte; though the result should be merely the gaining a little time, I should even then have sufficient reason to be satisfied with it. I have enclosed you the letter \* which, in consequence of this determination, I wrote to the Grand Vizier; sending him, at the same time, a duplicate of that from Bonaparte †.

If this minister meets my advances, I shall propose to him the restitution of Egypt on the following conditions ‡:

“The Grand Signior shall appoint a Pasha, as heretofore.”

“The Beys shall give up to him the Miri, which the Porte has had always *de jure*, and never *de facto*.”

“Commerce shall be reciprocally open between Egypt and Syria.”

“The French shall continue in the country, occupy the strong holds and the forts, and collect all the duties and customs, till the French government shall have made peace with England.”

If these summary preliminaries are accepted, I shall think I have rendered my country a greater service than if I had obtained the most brilliant victory. But I fear they will not be attended to: if the haughtiness of the Turks opposes no obstacle, I shall still have to combat the influence of English gold. Happen what may, I will endeavour to direct myself by circumstances.

I know all the importance of the possession of Egypt. I used to say in Europe, that this country was for France the point of fixture, by means of which she might move at will the commercial system of every quarter of the globe; but to do this effectually, a powerful lever is required, and that lever is a navy. OURS HAS EXISTED! Since that period, every thing has changed; and peace with the Porte is, in my opinion, the only expedient

tained that, when he stated the loss of the Turks at eighteen thousand men, he had merely put down a cipher too many; this hope is now done away by the unsuspected evidence of Kléber, which unfortunately reduces Bonaparte's number only one half. The rest of Kléber's information is of the most important and consolatory nature. The army of which Bonaparte and Berthier represent the whole to have been destroyed, was merely a detachment, it appears, from a much greater force; which, without any sensible diminution of its numbers or resolution, was still hovering near the place of action, and alarming the French for the safety of Brulos and Damietta!

\* See No. XVI.

† See No. XIV.

‡ Of these conditions, the first is unnecessary, the second impracticable, the third nugatory, and the fourth inadmissible. It is evident, however, that Kléber expected nothing from them; they are merely projected in obedience to the commands of Bonaparte, to whom this excellent officer pays the same deference as if he were still at the head of the army. Indeed the whole of his conduct, as it appears in this well-written letter, is admirable in the highest degree; he feels that he is betrayed, yet not a murmur escapes him on his own account; and though he holds it a part of his duty to expose the weakness of which Bonaparte either was, or affected to be ignorant, he determines to hazard more, perhaps, than his own better judgment approved, to carry his instructions into execution with the smallest deviation possible.



that holds out to us a method of fairly getting rid of an enterprise no longer capable of attaining the object for which it was undertaken.

I shall not enter, Citizen Directors, into the details of all the diplomatic combinations which the present state of Europe might furnish : this is not my province. In the forlorn situation in which I stand, and so far removed from the centre of action, I can scarce give a thought to any thing but the safety and honour of the army which I command : happy if, in the midst of my distresses, I should have the good fortune to meet your wishes ; at a less distance from you I should place all my glory in obedience.

I have annexed to this an exact estimate of the more material articles of which we stand in need for the service of the artillery \* : and also a summary recapitulation of the debt contracted and left unpaid by General Bonaparte †.

Health and respect.

KLÉBER.

P. S. At this instant, Citizen Directors, just as I am making up my dispatches, I learn that fourteen or fifteen Turkish vessels are at anchor before Damietta, where they are waiting for the fleet of the Captain Pasha, now at Joppa, and having on board, as I am told, from fifteen to twenty thousand land forces ; besides these, there are still fifteen thousand men at Gaza, and the Grand Vizier is marching from Damascus. A few days since, he sent us back a soldier of the 25th demi-brigade, who had been made prisoner in the neighbourhood of El Arisch ; after having showed him all his camp, he desired him to acquaint his comrades with what he had seen, and to tell their commander to tremble. This seems to announce either the confidence which the Grand Vizier has in his forces, or a wish to enter upon an accommodation. With respect to myself, it will be *absolutely impossible* for me to get together more than five thousand men capable of taking the field against him ; notwithstanding this, I will try my fortune, if I do not succeed in gaining time by my negotiations. Dgezzar has withdrawn his forces from Gaza, and marched them back to Acre.

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No. V.

*Head Quarters, Cairo, August 31, 1799.*

KLÉBER, *Commander in Chief, to the Army.*

Soldiers,

MOTIVES of the most imperious nature have determined the Commander in Chief, Bonaparte, to return to France.

The dangers incident to a voyage undertaken in no very favourable part of the year ‡, on a narrow sea, covered with the enemies' fleets, were too feeble to arrest him. Your happiness was at stake.

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\* See No. VII.

† See No. VI.

‡ The 22d of August may seem to those unacquainted with the Mediterranean, no very unfavourable season for putting to sea ; but the north-west winds, which

Soldiers! a powerful reinforcement, or a glorious peace, is at hand: a peace worthy of you and of your achievements, is on the point of restoring you to your country.

In taking upon myself the charge with which Bonaparte was intrusted, I was neither unaware of its importance, nor of the toil and danger attending it; but on the other hand, when I considered your gallantry, so often crowned with the most brilliant success; your unwearied patience in braving every calamity, and supporting every privation; when I considered, in short, all that might be done or attempted with such soldiers, I lost sight of every thing but the advantage of being at your head, and the honour of commanding you; and I felt myself inspired with new vigour.

Soldiers! rely upon what I say; your urgent wants shall be the never-ceasing object of my most earnest solicitude.

(Signed) KLÉBER.

By order of the Commander in Chief, the General of Division, and Chief of the Staff.

(Signed) DAMAS.

A true copy.

(Signed) -DUMAS, Adjutant General.

A true copy.

LE ROY.

# No. VI.

Army of the East.

French Republic.

*ESTIMATE of the different Sums due on the 23d of August, 1799, the Period at which GENERAL KLÉBER took upon himself the Command of the Army.*

	Sums due.
PAY of the army - - - - -	4,015,000 0 0
Extraordinaries - - - - -	576,000 0 0
Difference of pay, between the law of the 2d Thermidor, in the year 2, and that of the 23d Floreal, in the year 5, due to part of the army - - - - -	802,332 6 2
Artillery - - - - -	91,214 0 0
Engineers - - - - -	- - - - -
Marine, military, and merchant service, by a rough calculation - - - - -	3,962,124 0 6
Military subsistence - - - - -	1,988,973 10 0
Clothing - - - - -	144,381 10 10
Military hospitals - - - - -	311,277 15 4
Military convoys - - - - -	177,098 4 0

almost constantly prevail there about this period, make the voyage to France extremely tedious, and fully justify Kléber's observation. For the rest, this ADDRESS, delivered while that General was yet smarting from the recent perfidy of Bonaparte, may be recommended to the reader as a model of generosity, manliness, and true military honour.

Military posts	-	-	-	-	5,432	12	2
To the Inspector of the saddle manufactory	-	-	-	-	12,601	0	0
To the Inspector of the boot manufactory	-	-	-	-	6,000	0	0
To the Commissaries at Suez	-	-	-	-	7,014	6	0
To certain French, Turks, and Greeks, who have furnished provisions at Alexandria, and elsewhere	-	-	-	-	41,980	7	0
To Citizen Rosetty for provisions for the army, when on its march to Rhamanie	-	-	-	-	3,222	12	8
Total					11,315,252	10	2

## OBSERVATIONS.

Since the army quitted France, the expenditure has exceeded the receipts by 11,315,252 livres, 10 sous, 2 deniers—this debt, then, must inevitably continue increasing. At our first arrival here, requisitions were made in all the towns for the immediate subsistence of the troops. These have never been paid for.

Extraordinary contributions were levied upon the merchants, tradesmen, &c.

The effects of the Mameloucs were also seized on our arrival: *their wives* have been made to pay an extraordinary imposition.

The receipts of the last year were greater than those of the present can possibly be. The inundation has failed, and many villages have been deprived of water.

The debt above stated, does not include what is due to the provinces for the supplies in kind, with which the troops were furnished during their march.

It is evident from these observations, that, as long as the Army of Egypt is engaged in hostilities, there can be no foreign trade; nor can the receipts be possibly made to answer the expences. It is peace alone which can place the receipts on a satisfactory footing.

Certified by me,

E. POUSSIELGUE, Commissary-General, &c. to be conformable to the respective lists delivered to me at Cairo, Oct. 7, 1799.

Examined by the Commander in Chief,

(Signed) KLÉBER.

## No. VII.

*Etat des principaux Objets relatifs à l'Artillerie manquant à l'Armement des Places, à l'Armée active, & à l'Equipage de Siège.*

Nature des Objets.				Total.
Bouches à feu	{	Canons de tous calibres	- -	309
		Mortiers et pierriers de différens cali-	- -	
		bres	- -	
	{	Obusiers de différens calibres	- -	



*Nature des Objets manquant à l'Armement, &c.*

Affûts de rechange de toutes espèces		-	-	-	187
Boulets de différens calibres		-	-	-	200,000
Bombes & obus de tous calibres		-	-	-	16,800
Balles de fer battu pour mitrailles		-	-	-	2,166,000
Grenades de remparts & à mains		-	-	-	10,000
Plombs en saumons		-	-	-	700,000 <i>lb.</i>
Poudre de guerre		-	-	-	1,150,000 <i>lb.</i>
Pierres à feu		-	-	-	1,000,000
Armes portatives	{	Fusils avec bayonnettes, baguettes, &c.	-	-	20,000
		Carabines	-	-	2,000
		Pistolets de calibre	-	-	4,000
		Bayonnettes de rechange	-	-	10,000
		Platines, idem	-	-	5,000
		Pièces de rechange de toutes espèces	-	-	40,000
	{	Sabres { à la housarde	-	-	1,200
		{ de cavalerie	-	-	1,200
		{ d'infanterie	-	-	6,000
		{ d'artillerie	-	-	1,000
Outils	{	à Pionniers { Pelles { Quarrées	-	-	3,200
		{ Rondes	-	-	6,500
		{ Hoyaux	-	-	6,500
		{ à Roc	-	-	1,200
	{	Tranchans { Haches	-	-	1,800
		{ Serpes	-	-	2,600
	d'Ouvriers en fer & en bois de toutes espèces		-	-	4,634
Fers de différens échantillons (quintaux)		-	-	-	800 <i>qx.</i>
Aciers (quintaux)		-	-	-	160 <i>qx.</i>
Charbon de terre (quintaux)		-	-	-	2,400 <i>qx.</i>
Forges de campagnes		-	-	-	10
Feuilles de fer blanc		-	-	-	150,000
Tôle (feuilles)		-	-	-	1,200
Cuivre laminé (quintaux)		-	-	-	250 <i>qx.</i>
Bois (solives de différens échantillons)		-	-	-	6,000
Bois de fusils		-	-	-	10,000
Etoffes pour sachets (aunes, &c.)		-	-	-	35,000
Papiers pour gargousses & cartouches (rames, &c.)		-	-	-	1,060
Sacs à terre		-	-	-	300,000
Mèches (livres)		-	-	-	150,000
Cordages & menus cordages (quintaux)		-	-	-	100 <i>qx.</i>
Poix noire, blanche, résine, goudron, soufre, cire & Suisse (livres de)		-	-	-	18,000
Ustensiles d'artifices de toutes espèces		-	-	-	1,000

(Signé)

KLÉBER,

Le Général en Chef.

Il n'y a dans les places que la moitié des bouches à feu nécessaires à leur armement & la plupart sont hors de service ; les meilleures sont à la marine, qui les redemande.

Le

Le charbon de bois est épuisé ; il n'y a aucun moyen d'en faire.  
Ce tableau au moins est appuyé d'un mémoire qu'on a cru inutile d'envoyer.

(Signé) KLÉBER.

*Au Caire, le 9 Vendémiaire, an 7.*

(Signé) Le Général d'Artillerie, FOUGER.

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\* \* \* As the real importance of this paper can only be duly appreciated by military men, who will undoubtedly understand it better in the original than in any translation that can be offered by such as are but imperfectly acquainted with the terms of the science ; it is given to them as it came from the hands of Kléber.

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No. VIII.

MARINE OFFICE.

*Alexandria, October 1, 1799.*

LE ROY, *Commissary of the Marine in Egypt, to the Minister of Marine and of the Colonies.*

Citizen Minister,

I MOST anxiously wish that the safe arrival of the four vessels under the command of Rear-Admiral Ganteaume may have put you in possession of the short letter which I had just time to dispatch ; duplicates of which were put on board them on the 22d of August, the day of their departure.

At all events, however, I send you a list of the names, &c. of those vessels :

*Le Muiron*, of 28 guns, 18-pounders on the main deck. Ganteaume, Rear-admiral ; De la Rue, Captain.

*Le Carrère*, of 28 guns, 12-pounders. Dumanoir le Pelley, General of Division.

(Both these frigates are Venetian built ; bolted with iron, and coppered here ; the first on the 24th of October, and the second the 15th of November last.)

*L'Indépendant*, Advice-boat, 4 six-pounders. Gastaud, Ensign.

*La Révanche*, Advice-boat, 4 three-pounders. Picard, Ensign.

General Bonaparte took his passage on board *Le Muiron*. The Proclamations, which I enclose, first announced to the army his departure, and the appointment of General Kléber in his stead.

I should have been happy to send you a correct list of the passengers on board these four vessels ; but the *secrecy of their departure* prevented the names from being entered on the registers of the proper office ; and I have asked in vain for information from the officers of the present staff. You

will find at the conclusion of my letter the only list which the first clerk of the Navy Office was able to procure me ; and another made up on conjecture.

General Bonaparte and Rear-admiral Ganteaume will have given you better information than I can pretend to do on our internal situation. I shall merely confine myself to hazarding a few brief observations on the port of Alexandria.

Deprived of nearly all correspondence with France since our arrival in this country, we have the most undoubted proofs of the successful activity of the enemy in intercepting our communications. It strikes me therefore, that it would be exceedingly proper to dispatch, by a swift-sailing vessel, a cipher that would at once enable me to send you more detailed accounts.

From the time that General Bonaparte left us, the men on the look-out have discovered but three ships in the offing ; and a boat which was suspected to have dispatches on board. We might easily have taken it, had we been provided with a few light, copper-bottomed vessels. It certainly does not fall within my department to say any thing respecting the naval forces, the sole means of giving effect to the successes of the land army ; but I must, notwithstanding, do myself the honour to hint to you, that, during those periods when the blockade is accidentally raised, a few corvettes, carrying from 12 to 16 guns, and coppered, might be successfully employed on expeditions of the utmost utility to the colony.

Here is a copy of a report made to the Directory by the Commander in Chief : " We have a confused account of an army collecting in Syria, under the immediate command of the Grand Vizier, composed, first of the troops which followed him from Constantinople ; secondly, of those of Djezzar, Pashaw of Acre, and thirdly, of the remainder of the Mameloucs, under Ibrahim, ancient Cheick el Beled, or chief of the Beys."

Whatever, Citizen Minister, may be the issue of our military operations, I cannot but think it of the utmost moment that the Executive Directory should appoint a commissary, with the requisite powers, to supply the void of the inspection, formerly confided to the ambassador at the Ottoman Porte. They should also consult on the means, either of diminishing the losses of the Levant trade ; or rather of reproducing and invigorating it, at the period of peace : the employment and the subsistence of the southern provinces imperiously call for something of this kind.

These useful functions, Citizen Minister, should be confided to some former manager of these establishments ; one habituated to repair the evils which a war of invasion, and its attendant consequences, inevitably bring on foreign trade. It will be also essentially necessary to define with rigorous exactness the limits of authority in each department. Military ardour enters little into the system of a counterpoising power : it sacrifices every thing to the calls of the moment ; it seizes the officers, as well those of superior ranks as the subalterns. Soldiers forget what influence a respect for the laws and a love of order have on the event of things : they listen only to an interested ambition, and occasion, without intending it, disorders of the most irreparable kind. I have seen myself, an officer, in other respects a valuable character, insist upon commanding the harbour, the troops, and the workmen ! Did a Rear-admiral chance to drop in ; their authorities instantly clashed : confusion succeeded to confusion ; and private interest,



which alone pursues its object with steadiness, took advantage of these multiplied pretensions \* \* \* \* \*

[A few words illegible in the original.]

\* \* \* of the different orders in the Mediterranean, and the re-establishment of trade in that sea, call for the most prompt, decisive, and judicious measures.

Health and respect.

(Signed)

LE ROY.

P. S. Since my letter was finished, I have had an opportunity of procuring some information from the captain of a ship, who has frequented the ports of the Levant. The merchants have constantly rejected my application.

Our merchandise was usually exchanged in Egypt for the merchandise of the country, which consisted of the productions of Yemen, and those of the interior of Africa.

The Beys took from the traders the articles of which they stood in need but always on credit. They paid for them at their leisure; so that there are considerable debts still out-standing in most of the commercial towns of the country; some arising from exchanges which have not been completed and others from former demands.

In the present situation of things, it would seem to be no less an act of prudence than of justice to empower an agent of Government to lay before them the account-books of the different houses in advance, that an estimate may be formed of what is due to the whole body, and proper measures taken to recover it.

With respect to the other ports of the Levant, nothing but peace can enable the merchants to get in what is due to them. The object of Government should be to furnish them with the degree of protection necessary support and enforce their claims.

LE R.

#### ENCLOSURES.

##### No. 1.

*List of Passengers on board the under-mentioned Vessels, which sailed August 23d, 1799.*

*On board Le Carrère.*

Léon le Vavasseur, Director of the Artillery; Francis Joseph Allema, Captain of the frigate.

*On board Le Muiron.*

Joseph Marie Nouveau, Master-caulker, from the *L'Orient*, and is employed at Alexandria.

Alexandria, September 9, 1799.

(Signed)

GIRAUD,

Under-Commissary of Marine.

A true copy,

LE ROY.

## No. 2.

*Conjectural List of Passengers on board the Ships of the Republic, under the Command of Rear-admiral Ganteaume.*

Viz.

Bonaparte, Commander in Chief.

Duroc,

La Vallette,

Beauharnois,

Merlin,

} Aid de Camps.

Fauvelet Boursienne, Secretary.

Berthier, General of Division.

L'Huilier, Aid de Camp.

Andréossi,

Lannes,

Murat,

Marmont,

} Generals of Brigade.

Montesney, Aid de Camp.

Beissieres, Chief of Brigade of Guides.

Monge,

Bertholet,

} Members of the National

Institute.

Denon,

Perceval,

} Members of the Egyptian

Institute.

L. R.

## No. IX.

Liberty.

French Republic.

Equality.

Cairo, October 10, 1799.

*Poussielgue, Comptroller of the Expenses of the Army, and Administrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to the Commissioners of the National Treasury.*

Citizen Commissioners,

SHALL have no account to lay before you till my return to France, or the freedom and safety of our communications shall be re-established. present account will be concise: it will be found more detailed in that our Paymaster-general.

confine myself to assuring you, that it is not possible to exhibit better in this department, more integrity and accuracy in the payments, or the observance of the rules prescribed by the laws, than your Paymaster-general has already shown.

In spite of the most severe economy, the army is extremely in arrear: it already amounts to more than ten millions; and, as our resources are daily diminishing, this arrear must necessarily increase. You will be successively pressed with the drafts which we have been obliged to give to different persons to whom we could by no means pay in specie; I intreat you earnestly

to honour them duly, as well for preserving to the army the only means of obtaining credit that are left, as for doing justice to a set of men, who are here sacrificing their health, and supporting every kind of privation imaginable.

Health and respect.

POUSSIELGUE.

No. X.

Liberty.

Equality.

Cairo, October 15, 1799.

E. Poussielgue \*, *Comptroller of the Expenses of the Army, and Administrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to Citizen Merlin, Member of the Executive Directory.*

Citizen Directors,

SINCE the delivery to Citizen Barras of the first dispatch which I had the honour to address to you, the particular conferences which have taken place with the Effendi, who is returned from Damascus, have afforded us, notwithstanding the letter of the Grand Vizier, some glimpses of a plan of accommodating matters, which may, in its consequences, become extremely important for the Republic; its final success, however, *depends entirely on* the part which the English may think proper to take in it.

General Kléber is now engaged in arranging for the Directory the notes which contain the substance of the conference. To me it is evident that the Grand Vizier would be disposed to do every thing we could wish; if he were not afraid that the instant his communications with us were discovered, Russia would suddenly fall upon the Ottoman Empire, which is at this time in no state of defence. But, if the Porte were sure of a powerful alliance, which would support her feeble efforts at the outset, and finally render her victorious, she would not hesitate an instant in forming her resolution. After all, these measures, as I have already said, cannot be put in execution unless the English become a party in them, and unite with the Porte and with us.

Now as the French Republic has nothing to apprehend from the English, which is not trifling when compared with the losses she must inevitably sustain from the establishment of the Russians in the Mediterranean; as there is not a chance of recovering from the English any part of what they have taken from us during the present war, but by an immediate treaty, which should hold out to them equivalent advantages elsewhere; and, on the sup-

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\* The name of Poussielgue is familiar to the readers of the Intercepted Correspondence. They have seen and admired his acute description of the victory of Aboukir: he appears here in a new light; and though his views for this country cannot be considered as evincing much knowledge of our character or connexions, yet his observations, as far as they respect France, must be allowed to be judicious. It would be superfluous to dwell on the importance of this letter, or to call the reader's attention to the hopeless situation of the French affairs in the Mediterranean. The desultory whining of Le Roy showed that their commerce was annihilated there; the strong and conclusive representations of Poussielgue prove that their military influence will not long survive it.



position that they would agree to no restitution, there would be no present purpose answered by continuing the war, and no inconvenience sustained by adjourning our claims (*réclamations*) to a happier period; the Executive Directory, if it should relish the plan resulting from the notes which General Kléber is preparing to send home, may easily remove every difficulty; and by an alliance with England and the Porte, deliver, at one stroke, the French Republic from these two powerful enemies, and from all the others, whose fall their defection from the alliance would necessarily ensure.

At all events, IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO OPEN NEGOTIATIONS IN THE MOST EARNEST MANNER WITH THE ENGLISH AND THE PORTE; EVEN IF NO OTHER ADVANTAGE SHOULD RESULT FROM THEM THAN GAINING TIME, AND GIVING OFFENCE TO RUSSIA; such offence as should induce her to declare war against the Grand Seignior, to an opportunity of doing which she seems to look forward with impatience.

Health and respect.

POUSSIELGUE.

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No. XI.

Liberty.

Army of the East.

Equality.

Head Quarters, Cairo, October 11, 1799.

Damas \*, General of Division, Chief of the Staff, General of the Army, to the Minister of War.

I HAVE the honour of transmitting you, Citizen Minister, the Proclamation of General Bonaparte to the army on taking leave of it; and that of General Kléber on taking upon him the Command in Chief:

Also the orders of the day, and the four numbers of the *Courier d'Egypte*, which have appeared since that period:

The list of the general, staff, and commissioned officers of the different corps, who have died, up to this day:

The list of the promotions which Kléber, the Commander in Chief, has judged it indispensable to make for the good of the service. You will feel yourself the necessity of it in comparing those two lists †.

I entreat you, Citizen Minister, to request the Executive Directory to confirm these promotions, and to transmit me the definitive nominations.

I cannot send you a detailed estimate of the general situation of the army at present; because, when I took upon me the function of Chief of the Staff, I was not able to find the particular estimates from which it must necessarily be formed. I hope to be enabled to transmit it by the first courier.

It is also out of my power, at this moment, to collect those of the various corps of the army, scattered as they are over so prodigious an extent of country as that which we have to defend; and of whom the greater num-

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\* Damas has already appeared in the First Part of the Intercepted Correspondence. See his letter, (p. 76), and what is there said of him. Though there seems to be a great degree of intimacy between him and Kléber, yet he probably owes his advancement to the head of the Staff no less to his own merit than to the kindness of the Commander in Chief. He is, indeed, a very excellent officer.

† It has been judged proper to omit them both—the necessity of Kléber's promotions is but too apparent from his own letter.

ber are, besides, incessantly occupied in pursuing the Arabs, or in combating the wandering Beys and their partisans, whose numbers rapidly increase the instant we allow them a moment's respite.

You may judge of the feeble state of the army, by its prodigious reduction since this time last year.

The number of effective men on the 22d of September 1798 was above 33,000\*; it is at present reduced below 22,000: from these must be taken 2000 sick and wounded, who are absolutely incapable of any duty whatever; besides 4000 utterly unable to take the field, or enter upon any active service. Most of these, though wounded, or labouring under diseases of the eyes, prefer staying at their quarters, to exposing themselves to the epidemic complaints which hospitals but too frequently generate in this country.

It results from this comparative statement, that the effective strength of the army is reduced a third within the last twelve months, and the actual number of those under arms decreased a full half.

The 16,000 men (comprising the forces of every description) which compose the army, are dispersed over a surface of country comprised within a triangle, of which the base extends from Marabout † to El Arisch, a line of near two hundred leagues, which is also the length of its two sides, of which that from El Arisch reaches beyond the first Cataracts (which may be considered as its apex), and the other from the Cataracts again to Marabout.

Experience fully proves, Citizen Minister, at this instant, that when the garrisons indispensably necessary for the security of the fortresses and the provinces, are deducted from the number of men capable of bearing arms, it will be impossible to collect a force of 7000 men at any one point, to oppose the efforts of an enemy which menaces us with an irruption on every side.

I presume that the Commander in Chief, when writing to the Executive Directory, gave them more circumstantial information respecting the situation of the army, and every part of the colony.

Health and respect.

DAMAS.

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\* In estimating the army that disembarked in Egypt at 42,000 (see the Second Part of the Intercepted Correspondence, p. 196,) it is evident that no deception was practised, no turn for exaggeration indulged. Even after the storming, as it is called, of Alexandria, a place so strong, that, according to Sonnini, the jackals used to leap in and out every night through the breaches in the walls, the numbers lost in crossing the Desert of the Nile, the bloody engagement on that river, and the numerous skirmishes which Bonaparte has dignified with the name of Battles of the Pyramids, &c. &c. it appears that the effective force of the French still consisted of 33,000 men; a calculation that leaves a deficit of 9000 for the sick (who appear, from Duval's letter, Part I. p. 176, to be very numerous), the killed, and the wounded, in the short space of fifteen weeks! It is probable that none of Bonaparte's admirers will be intrepid enough to deny this loss. But then, they will say, he acquired possession of the country by it. This may be granted them in their turn; and then it will only remain to inquire whether the loss of the 33,000 men that were left, and which is sure to be sustained in the evacuation of it, will not rather overbalance that boasted advantage?

† A small bay, a little to the south-west of Alexandria, where the French first landed.

## No. XII.

LIBERTY.

EQUALITY.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Cairo, September 22, 1799.

E. POUSSIELGUE \*, *Comptroller of the Expenses of the Army, and Administrator-general of the Finances of Egypt, to the EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY.*

*Citizen Directors,*

I HAVE been exclusively charged, since the arrival of the army in Egypt, with the administration of the finances, and of the other departments connected with the political economy of this country.

I conceive I owe you, after the departure of General Bonaparte, and in the critical situation in which he left us, a concise but faithful representation of the observations which I have collected, and the political opinions which naturally flow from them.

Travellers, and even the agents of the French Government, who have been in Egypt, have so cordially agreed in the exaggerated ideas which they have disseminated respecting the natural riches, and the treasures which this country contains, that a residence of fifteen months, with multiplied researches, and experiments by a great number of enlightened men, have not yet totally effaced the false impressions they had given.

The ordinary revenues, including the customs, were estimated from 49 to 50,000,000; some have even carried them as far as 60,000,000.

They can only be reckoned, in time of peace, at 19,000,000: a system of commerce well managed, and well protected, might raise them to 20,000,000.

In time of war (such as that in which we have been incessantly engaged) the revenues do not, by any means, exceed 12 or 13,000,000.

Abundance in Egypt depends, first, on a good Nile; and, secondly, on the distribution of the water: every year the canals must be cleaned out, the dikes repaired, and care taken that none of them be cut sooner or later than the common interest appears to require.

The distribution and the maintenance of the canals are very far from being carried here to that degree of utility which one would expect to find in a country, whose fertility entirely depends on the observation of these two circumstances.

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\* This is the longest letter yet received from Egypt, and, in many respects, the most important. It is no exaggeration to say, that it contains truer views of the finances, polity, &c. of that country, than most of the volumes written expressly on the subject. But it is not in this light alone that this masterly production comes recommended to the reader; it corroborates all Kleber's statements; it paints the miseries of Bonaparte's deserted troops in the most forcible manner; and it seems expressly drawn up (from an elaborate examination of facts) to prepare the French Government for the news they will shortly receive, either of the total loss of the "Army of the East," or Egypt. This will not come unexpectedly on Bonaparte, though, with a dissimulation equal to his cruelty, he affected to take no notice, in the letter which he left behind him, of any wants that might not be removed by a supply of powder, &c. or any distresses that might not be relieved by a company of comedians!



Even when the Nile is good, a great quantity of land remains uncultivated, for want of order in cutting the dikes: but when the Nile is bad, or middling, the loss is ten times greater than it ought to be, because all the villages being equally afraid of wanting water, those who border on the river hasten, before the proper time, to cut the dikes; which is never done without a contest with the villages interested in opposing it: and by this inconsiderate method of proceeding, a great part of the water, already so scarce, is lost without procuring the least advantage.

But however productive the harvests may be, they cannot, under the present system, increase the revenues of the Government, although it be itself proprietor of two-thirds of the lands of Egypt; while, on the other hand, a bad Nile diminishes them considerably.

The Egyptian system of finance is entirely feudal.

The peasant ploughs and sows for his own advantage, in consideration of a fixed rent which he pays in money, or in kind, to the proprietor.

This rent may be divided into three distinct heads.

The *Miri*: this is a kind of ground-rent due to the Grand Seignior; the proprietor receives and pays it in to the Effendi appointed to collect it.

This *miri*, imposed on the lands, amounts to 3,000,000 livres, according to all the rent-rolls which fell into my hands.

The second kind of rent is called *Fais*; it is the quit-rent, or neat income, originally appropriated to the proprietor: it amounts, like the former, for all the lands, those of Government included, to 3,000,000.

The third kind is called *Barani*, or *Moudaf*; it is composed, first, of an over-charge of income, laid on by the proprietor by way of supplement to the *fais*. Secondly, of extraordinary requisitions of every kind, made on the village, either of money or of produce. Thirdly, of expenses caused by the passage of the troops, or by the visits of the proprietor. Fourthly, of all the official charges of the village and the province, pious foundations, &c. &c. These united, produce from all the landed property of Egypt, 6,400,000.

Besides this, there is a sum of 1,300,000 arising from the duties which the Cachefs used to collect for their own advantage in the provinces which they governed.

Thus it appears that the sum total of the revenues in specie which are raised from the cultivators of the lands of Egypt (exclusive of the immense peculations of the Copts who collect them) amounts pretty nearly to 14,000,000.

From these must be deducted 3,200,000 livres for the *fais* and the *baranis* of the lands which do not appertain to the Government, and which are estimated at a third of Egypt: there will then remain to the Government 10,800,000.

It is not possible to obtain more than this, without making advances, or exactions.

To this revenue must be added the *fais* and *barani* which is paid in kind. This only takes place in the provinces of Upper Egypt.

This is estimated at 1,800,000 quintals of all kinds of grain, for that portion which belongs to the Government: taking the whole as equivalent to 1,000,000 quintals of good wheat, at 3 livres 10 sols each, it will amount to 3,500,000 livres.

From this must be deducted 850,000 for the expenses of collecting and carrying, which amount to 17 sols for every quintal delivered at Cairo: there remain then 2,650,000 livres.

In time of peace the produce of the customs and of the other indirect duties is usually stated at about 5,000,000.

The Mint produces 750,000.

From this it appears that the revenues of the Government in time of peace will be 10,200,000 livres; but in the state of war in which we are, the customs and indirect revenues do not produce more than 1,500,000.

The grain of Upper Egypt which is not sold on the spot, and which we have not sufficient means to bring down the country, will not produce more than a million.

The discharges that must be given to the villages for the lands not watered, will amount to more than 1,500,000.

There must still be deducted a number of charges and pensions granted to the country, and which we have been obliged to continue; the expenses of the caravan to Mecca, which were partly supplied by us last year, and which must be wholly so, this; the expenses of the Divans of the Provinces, and of the Janissaries of the country: all these will take off nearly 3,000,000.

It is not possible, then, to take the revenues appropriated to the army at more than 9 or 10,000,000; of this sum there only remains about 2,000,000 to be obtained from this period to the 20th of December next.

General Bonaparte levied, in the first months of our arrival, on the different nations, and on the merchants, about 4,000,000 livres of extraordinary contributions. He also laid a duty of two-fifths of a year's revenue on the landed property of individuals, which brought in about 1,200,000.

These expedients are worn out. No more extraordinary contributions can be looked for in a country where all trade has been at an end for nineteen months. The money of the Christians is exhausted; we cannot ask the Turks for any without occasioning a revolt; and, besides, we should in no case obtain it. The money is hid; and the Turks, still more than the Christians, suffer themselves to be imprisoned, to be beaten in the most cruel manner; nay, SOME OF THEM HAVE EVEN SUFFERED THEIR HEADS TO BE CUT OFF RATHER THAN DISCOVER WHERE THEY HAD CONCEALED THEIR TREASURES\*.

The collection of the revenues begins in November for the rice-grounds; in January for the land appropriated to wheat, and other articles which pay in money; and in June for those which pay in kind.

The peasantry are still more tenacious of their money than the inhabitants of the towns; they never pay but when they are absolutely forced to it, and even then sous by sous: their money is hid, their produce and their other property buried in the ground; they know they must pay at last, and that, by doing it voluntarily, and at the regular periods, they might save them-

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\* This most admirable plan of tax-gathering, which Bonaparte has introduced with such eclat into Egypt (the country which, as he says, he went to civilize and enlighten), though worthy of his unbounded talents for finance, is not of his invention; he acquired the knowledge of it during his apprenticeship under Robespierre, who, with his wonted facetiousness, used to call the operation of the guillotine, COINING!

selves from those violent measures which always cost them double, or ruin them. They prefer waiting for a column of troops; if they see them coming, they immediately flee with their wives, their children, and their cattle; and the soldiers find nothing at their arrival but a number of empty hovels. If they fancy themselves strong enough to resist, they give battle, and call in the neighbouring villages, and even the Arabs, to their assistance. They have always scouts abroad to give them timely notice of the approach of the troops.

Sometimes it is possible to seize the chiefs of the village. They are thrown into prison, and kept there till the village has discharged what is due: this expedient is tedious, and does not always succeed. If we are fortunate enough to carry off their camels, buffaloes, and sheep, they suffer them to be sold, instead of attempting to recover them by paying their debt, and expose themselves to the hazard of dying with hunger, leaving their lands uncultivated for the succeeding year!

It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to maintain perpetually in each of the sixteen provinces of Egypt a column of eighty or a hundred men, whose sole employment is to force the villagers to pay their taxes: very frequently after a long and laborious round the soldiers return with a mere trifle.

It is easy to conjecture all the evils, the exactions, the havoc and waste, and the confusion, which commonly attend those rounds, and which the severest discipline can neither prevent nor remedy.

An inconvenience of a very serious nature arises to prevent the collecting of the taxes during the eight months in which the country is not inundated; it is the period when the Arabs undertake their predatory incursions, when landings are made on the coasts, and when we are threatened with attacks from every quarter. It then becomes necessary for us to be continually fighting; and a column of troops has scarce begun to move forward, before it is compelled to fall back, in order to punish the revolted villages, or to expel the Mameloucs and the Arabs!

The collection of grain is still more difficult. Like the tax in specie, it is absolutely necessary to compel the villages, *at the point of the bayonet*, to pay what is due; it must then be taken to the magazines on the banks of the Nile, embarked in boats, and sent down the river to Cairo.

When the two first difficulties are overcome, the third, more difficult than either, still remains, on account of the small number of boats which can be found for these convoys, and the short time they can be used, which is only during the four months in which the Nile is navigable. Since our arrival a prodigious number of boats have been cut up and burnt for want of other fuel\*; these neither have, nor can by any possible means, be re-

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\* The exasperation of the natives only could follow the wanton abuse of the furniture and ornaments of the palaces of Rome, for fuel. In Egypt more is hazarded;—they burn the boats of the Nile, the very boats which can alone render the country productive to them, by the transport of its produce to the capital.

Nor is this all! there is no timber in Egypt, and it will require ages to repair the havoc of this accursed expedition, which, though fleeting and transitory, will leave behind it traces of destruction infinitely deeper than have ever yet been inflicted on this unhappy country, by the numerous visitations of Heaven and man! Already "the city is in want of bread;" and it can afford little consolation to the inhabitants, that their tyrants are involved in the same misery with themselves. A speedy death, or a



placed; a part of what is left is constantly employed in following the movements of the troops who are in pursuit of Mourad Bey.

Last year we were obliged to purchase for ready money at Cairo, notwithstanding the scarcity of specie, corn for the subsistence of the army, to the amount of more than 300,000 livres, though we had at that very time several millions worth in Upper Egypt.

This year the boats have been exclusively employed in bringing down the Government stores: the consequence of this has been an inconvenience of another kind; the city of Cairo is in want of bread, and the uneasiness of the people on the occasion has already produced some degree of fermentation!

In despite of all these disagreeable circumstances, there was last year some specie in the country; some had been brought in by the commerce of the preceding year; and yet, *when Bonaparte left us, there were more than 100,000,000 still due to the army, of which the mere pay of the troops amounted to 4,000,000.*

At present the specie has entirely disappeared; nothing is now to be seen but medins \*, which circulate from hand to hand with inconceivable rapidity!

This coin bears but little more than a third of the intrinsic value of the other coins. Before the war, Spanish dollars were brought here in abundance, and the medins carried away; at present the dollars are all taken off by the coffee trade with Yemen, where they are sent to the mint, and melted down; so that, like the gold coin, they become more valuable as they become more scarce, and the medins more plentiful. The consequence of this is, a rise in the price of every article, and a number of obstacles in the circulation of cash.

The present superabundance of all the mercantile productions of Egypt, arising from the total cessation of foreign trade, is a circumstance still more disagreeable: it will complete the ruin of this country; for the villages being obliged to pay us always the same sums, and unable either to export, or to find a market for, their produce at home, will speedily see their inhabitants reduced to the last stage of misery; while the army, which had so

more speedy flight, will put an end to the sufferings of these; while those will linger on amidst the agonies of their families, or drop, exhausted with hunger, in the silent and deserted streets of the once populous Grand Cairo.

\* A copper coin of nearly the value of an English halfpenny. Here is a lamentable falling off from the louis, with which former letters represented the French as playing at *ducks and drakes*! What can have become of the 20,000,000 livres which Bonaparte affirmed to the Directory his soldiers had found on the bodies of the Mameloucs, killed at the "Battle of the Pyramids?" (*Intercepted Correspondence*, Part 1st, pp. 64, 166.) It cannot have found its way to France, unless in the pockets of Bonaparte: and even this may reasonably be doubted, since both Pouffielgue and Dugua seem to hint that this renowned General before his flight was reduced to the necessity of robbing the military chest.

But to return to the 20,000,000 livres: shall it be said that the Mameloucs recovered them again on the bodies of the French they have killed? The one is just as likely as the other: and body for body (for no advantage is meant to be taken of the superior numbers of the latter that have fallen), there is little hazard in maintaining that the Mameloucs have found as many louis as the French.

much difficulty to procure money while there was yet some in the country, will shortly be deprived of it altogether.

The military chest is always empty; and for a considerable period to come, we have not the most distant prospect of receiving more than 2 or 300,000 livres a month, while the ordinary expenses amount to more than 1,300,000 for the same space of time \*.

The natives of this country, notwithstanding their frequent insurrections, may be considered as a mild and tractable people; but they cannot be trusted; they are besides very far from *loving* us, although they have been treated with more kindness than was ever yet shown to any conquered people †!!!

The difference of manners, that extremely important one of language, and, above all, their religion, form obstacles of the most insuperable nature to every thing like a sincere affection.

They hate the government of the Mameloucs; they dread the yoke of Constantinople; but they will never be brought to endure ours, but in the hope of ultimately shaking it off. The only favour they might be disposed to grant, is, to allow us the preference of all the nations which THEY call Christians ‡.

We have here, on every side of us, ten thousand secret enemies to one open friend!

We had succeeded in maintaining a good intelligence with the Cherif of Mecca; and the letters which he wrote to Bonaparte and myself had quieted for an instant the consciences of the Mussulmen in this country: but we conjecture, from some spies which he has sent to Cairo since the arrival of the Grand Vizier at Damascus, that he has changed his opinion, and, in con-

\* This paragraph is so palpable a contradiction of the account delivered in by Bonaparte to the Legislative Commissions, and at the same time so consonant to the statements of Kleber, Dugua, &c. that if the General be not incapable of shame, he must sink with confusion at the sight of it.

† It appears from the official papers, that he made those Commissions grant a credit to the Minister of War of 12,000,000 livres for the army in Egypt, assuring them at the same time that this vote "would be no burden on the French finance, as ample provision was already made out of the revenue of Egypt, to supply all their wants."

‡ In this manner did he render nugatory the only prospect of relief held out to the troops whom he had abandoned, and this too, when he knew the depth of misery into which he had plunged them, and which he increased to the utmost of his power by taking with him the last farthing of the military chest.

† These *tractable* Egyptians must surely be the most perverse mules that ever existed! To revolt against the French, who use them more kindly than any conquered people was ever used; who only "cut their heads off," to obtain their money, and "point their bayonets at their breasts," to make them give up every thing else, argues a degree of ingratitude equal to the insensibility they all show in not *loving* such exquisite benefactors! and of which Pouffiegue so feelingly complains.

Seriously, what must be the treatment which they undergo, to force so mild a people to such frequent revolts? and what must be the inhuman insolence of the French, to give such a name to those natural expressions of indignation at the barbarous rapacity of their tyrants?

‡ "THEY call," is well put in—for it is likely that the Egyptians have fallen into the same error as the poor Peruvians, who took Christian to be synonymous with Spaniard.

sequence of the insinuations of the English, who have a force in the Red Sea, gone over to our enemies.

We had 31,000 effective men on our arrival in Egypt. There were then only Mameloucs and Arabs to fight; and yet these constantly and exclusively occupied the whole attention of the army to the end of January.

At present the Mameloucs, though dispersed, are notwithstanding *almost all* in existence; and may, whenever the attention of the army shall be otherwise occupied, reunite with the utmost promptitude: they have only lost four or five inferior chiefs; the principal ones who remain are still powerful, and have a considerable degree of interest.

The Arabs are not at all diminished; they hate us as much as they did at our arrival; and their wandering kind of life renders us no objects of apprehension to them.

When we first landed, the Egyptians believed, AS WE TOLD THEM, that it was *with the consent of the Grand Signior*, and they submitted with more docility: at present they are perfectly convinced of the contrary. Those who appear to be in our interest conceive themselves authorized, BY OUR LIE, to betray us: they will certainly do it on the first occasion\*; and their hearts were bounding with joy when the landing took place at Aboukir in August last.

But when to these numerous enemies, in the midst of whom we live, are added those from without; when the Grand Vizier, with the principal officers of the Ottoman Court, is assembling all the forces of the empire to attack us in different points at once, by land and sea, assisted too by England and Russia; when he calls upon all the people of this country to rise against us; and finally, when the few Arabs whom he had attached to us leave us to go over to him; it is not difficult to discover that our situation is desperate!

The enemy loses an army; he raises another instantly. He was beaten at Mount Tabor, two months after he was beaten at Aboukir: the same period is elapsed, and he is again ready to be beaten at Salahieh! But every victory carries off some of our best troops, *and their loss cannot be repaired.* A DEFEAT WOULD ANNIHILATE US ALL TO THE LAST MAN; AND HOWEVER BRAVE THE ARMY MAY BE, IT CANNOT LONG AVERT THAT FATAL EVENT!

The war has deprived us of a number of excellent officers, such as General Caffarelli, General Dommartin, General Bon, General Rambault, and General Dupuis; it has also deprived us of almost the whole corps of Engineers †, and of a very considerable part of the Chiefs of Brigade, both of

\* Can Pouffielgue wonder that a people so grossly deceived should feel the wish of deceiving in their turn? He is too sensible a man not to assure himself, if he reflects for a moment, that the system of fraud begun by themselves, will be propagated to all around them. Fidelity and attachment can never consist with that inveterate system of falsehood which has marked the commencement and progress of the whole conduct of France towards Egypt.

Non bene conveniunt, nec in unâ sede morantur.

† This corroborates a striking passage in a letter of Lacuée, an officer of this corps, to his uncle. Intercepted Correspondence, Part II. p. 135.

The conclusion of this paragraph conveys a tacit reproach to Bonaparte for depriving an army so circumstanced, of its Generals. That he would take Berthier with him,



infantry and cavalry. Several able Generals have left us, and Bonaparte has taken five with him.

The army, without clothes, and, above all, without arms, and without stores of any kind, reduced to less than two thirds of its original numbers, has now no more than eleven thousand men capable of taking the field, although about thirteen or fourteen thousand appear under arms: this is owing to the appearance of a great number of soldiers at the roll-call, who prefer, sick and wounded as they are, doing duty at their quarters to staying in the hospitals or in the depôts. When they are wanted to march a little farther than usual, or to fight, the force they have put upon themselves instantly appears. Wounds, ophthalmies, dysenteries, and other diseases not less common here, have absolutely disabled the rest of the army.

Even those who are in a condition to march, are exhausted by fatigue, enfeebled by the climate, and the wounds and sicknesses which they have endured; and their courage is proportionably diminished.

With this handful of men, we have to cover five hundred leagues of country; overawe three millions of inhabitants, who may be reckoned as so many enemies; and garrison the holds and fortresses of Alexandria, Rosetta, Rahmanie, Gizeh, Benisuef, Medine, Miniet, Siout, Girgê, Kené, Cosséir, Cairo, Suez, Mitt Kanîar, Salahieh, El Arisch, Bilbeis, Catieh, Damietta, Mansora, Semenoud, and El Benouf. Should the Grand Vizier attack us, we cannot oppose more than five or six thousand men to all the Ottoman forces which will be at his disposal; and should he attack us in two places at once, he will penetrate into the country without a possibility on our side of preventing him: this would certainly have happened to General Bonaparte, if the Turks, while they were landing at Aboukir, had made the Syrian army advance upon Egypt!

In three months we shall be obliged to encounter, a second time, that destructive malady the plague, which may make dreadful havoc amongst us: this horrible prospect dismays the stoutest hearts.

To put the finishing hand to our misfortunes, the Nile of this year has been extremely bad, having flowed off suddenly, and before the lands could be inundated in due succession; we shall not be able to draw any contribution from the villages which have not received their water, and we are threatened with the most frightful misery!

There is not a soldier, not an officer, not a general who does not most earnestly long to return to France; persuaded, as they all are, that they are sacrificing here, without any advantage to their country, their health, and their lives!

However, from the present situation of things in France, and considering that for more than fifteen months it has not been possible to send us any assistance, it is clear that we must forego the hope of having it in any time to do us service, especially as the favourable season has now been suffered to pass by.

The army saw with pleasure General Kléber at their head after the de-

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there were strong reasons for believing; but it does not appear why four others should be selected to share the disgrace of his flight, unless it were to increase the difficulties of Kléber and the despondency of the army.

parture of General Bonaparte : no one is more capable of inspiring them with confidence and esteem.

But he is full of honour, and of noble pride ; and the more sensible he is of the difficulty of the task thus left him, the more fearful he will be of listening to sentiments imperiously dictated by circumstances, and the immediate interest of the army, but which might some time hence be attributed, perhaps, to timidity.

Not having the same responsibility on me, I am not afraid, Citizen Directors, to lay before you the naked truth ; and be assured that, however strong the representation I have just made, you will find it but feeble and imperfect, if the limits of a letter would allow me to enter into greater details.

Egypt is a very fine country ; our dreadful situation in it is merely the effect of circumstances. It proves only that we are arrived too soon, and that the time is not yet come for us to establish ourselves.

There is not a doubt, but that, if we were peaceable masters of Egypt, we might in a few years entirely remove a great part of the evils which infest and desolate it, such as the plague and the Arabs ; and give to agriculture and commerce a new activity, which should restore this country to its ancient splendour. This would render it one of the finest colonies in the world, which would speedily become the centre of universal commerce.

But Egypt is bounded by two seas (the Red Sea and the Mediterranean), and by deserts.

It is necessary to have a powerful marine to be in a condition of approaching it at pleasure ; and above all, to be enabled to protect its commerce, and ensure all the advantages which it holds out.

The French Republic is at present without a navy ; it will be yet a long time before it can have created one capable of contending with that of our enemies.

To pretend to preserve Egypt without having any means of sending thither, and of assuring the safety of our convoys of every kind, is merely to expose ourselves to the hazard of being compelled to abandon it to Russia or England, who, under the pretext of driving us from it, will establish themselves there, and very soon take effectual measures to exclude us from it for ever.

We might, indeed, still maintain ourselves there if we had the permission of the Porte ; but if it was not thought possible to obtain it before our invasion, it must be still less so now, when the Porte lies at the mercy of the Russians and English : and even were she, contrary to all appearances, disposed, from political considerations, to suffer us to occupy Egypt provisionally, the English would never be induced to permit it.

When the expedition to Egypt took place, we were at peace on the Continent ; we had still a considerable fragment of our naval force in the Mediterranean ; and we were in possession of the whole of Italy, Corsu, and Malta ; a hope, too, might have been indulged that we should obtain the consent of the Porte, at least tacitly ; and thus we should have gained the end we proposed, against the English ; for it is my opinion, with that of all the world, that our proper view was, by alarming them for the safety of their Indian possessions, to force them into a peace, advantageous for the

Republic, by making the evacuation of Egypt an object of compensation for the restitutions which we should in that case have required!

BUT THE FATAL ENGAGEMENT OF ABOUKIR RUINED ALL OUR HOPES. It prevented us from receiving the remainder of the forces which were destined for us; it left the field free for the English to persuade the Porte to declare war against us; it rekindled that which was hardly extinguished with the Emperor of Germany; it opened the Mediterranean to the Russians, and planted them on our frontiers; it occasioned the loss of Italy, and the invaluable possessions in the Adriatic, which we owed to the successful campaigns of Bonaparte; and finally, it at once rendered abortive all our projects, since it was no longer possible for us to dream of giving the English any uneasiness in India: add to this, that the people of Egypt, whom we wished to consider as friends and allies, instantaneously became our enemies, and, entirely surrounded as we were by the Turks, we found ourselves engaged in a most difficult defensive war, without a glimpse of the slightest future advantage to be derived from it\*.

At present we can no longer flatter ourselves that the English will be prevailed on to agree to an equivalent in the articles of peace, for the evacuation of Egypt. For, in the first place, they know perfectly well the degree of weakness and want to which we are reduced, and which renders it impossible to undertake any thing against them: and in the second, that even if we should receive succours (which they will use every means in their power to prevent), we should not, on that account, be a jot farther advanced while we have the Turks to contend with; and while they are assured that the Porte will not make peace without their consent, or without stipulating that the preliminary article for terminating the war, shall be the evacuation of Egypt.

Under this point of view, our plan has totally failed; in as much as it can no longer affect the English; and thus, neither as a conquest nor a colony, can there be any farther pretence for keeping possession of Egypt.

But there is yet another consideration; it is, that if we delay entering into a treaty (such is the state of weakness to which we are already reduced),

\* This is a most magnificent description of the immense advantages derived to the common cause of Europe, from the glorious victory of Lord Nelson. It is the more honourable for this country, as it comes from the unsuspected testimony of an enemy, who had nothing but truth and the real interests of France in view, when he drew it up. It differs a little, it must be confessed, from the ingenious statement handed about by the friends of France in this country with such prodigious applause, and which the reader may possibly have seen. In that, all the advantages were, *of course*, placed on the side of France, who was made debtor (for it was quite a matter of calculation) for eleven sail of the line, *not too highly valued*; and creditor for the whole of Tuscany and Naples; which, it appeared, left a balance of several millions sterling, *errors excepted*, in her favour! It is probable that she never received them; but this detracts nothing from the good will of her friends, who, on looking wistfully across the water, have often found cause to cry out with Helena,

— 'tis pity  
That *wishing well* had not a body in't  
Which might be felt: that *we, the poorer sort,*  
Whose *baser* stars do shut us up in wishes,  
Might with *effect* of them follow OUR FRIENDS—



there is reason to fear that we shall be too late; that the remainder of the army will perish, or that we shall be obliged to evacuate the country without any conditions at all; while, on the contrary, we have it at present in our power to make it the price of peace with the Ottoman Empire and the Barbary States, the strengthening our old connexions with Constantinople, and resuming in the Levant that exclusive commerce which we once enjoyed.

This treaty, to which **THE ENGLISH MUST BE ADMITTED AS A PARTY**, will be a preparatory step to that peace which it is, at length, more than time to conclude with them\*. It will infallibly induce Russia to declare war against the Porte, and cause a diversion of the most important kind in our affairs in Europe; *we might even hope to regain by it what we have lost in the Mediterranean.*

I have the greater confidence in this opinion, because I am persuaded that the English cannot see without some uneasiness, and without a secret kind of jealousy, the progress of the Russians—a progress much more dangerous for them than our continental power, now that our navy is destroyed, and that we have lost our maritime conquests.

The only event which could possibly enable us to preserve Egypt, would be an immediate war between Russia and the Porte. All the Ottoman forces which are marching against us would instantly fly to protect the centre of the empire. In such a case, the Grand Seigneur would grant us peace on any terms we might think proper to ask.

But it is probable, that without a treaty of alliance between the French Republic and Russia, which might be useful to us at this moment, but which would certainly be impolitic, this last power will only wait till the Porte shall have made peace with us to declare war against her: for, by fighting against the Turks, we diminish his forces and his means. This is toiling for Russia, who, on her side, unable to make war against the Porte without forcing her to conclude a peace with us, attains her purpose, which is the destruction of that power, just as effectually by making war on the French, whom she knows to be her sole stay and support.

The Ottoman Empire is generally regarded as an old edifice, tottering to its fall. The European powers have long been preparing to divide its scattered fragments, and many politicians conceive that the catastrophe is

\* This admission, which Poussielgue pronounces indispensable, and on which he dwells with such earnestness towards the conclusion of his most admirable letter, arises wholly, or in great part, from the hopeless condition of the naval force of France.

Egypt, it is clear, must be speedily evacuated, or not a man of the Army of the East will be left alive: it becomes therefore a consideration of the next importance to preserve as much of the sad remains of it as possible; and this can only be done by the neutrality or friendship of the English. That another fugitive General (if another there be, base enough to sneak away from his post like a midnight thief) may, as Bonaparte did, effect his escape, is far from being impossible; but the attempt is hazardous, and the shame (which even success cannot lessen) such as a soldier of honour would rather die a thousand deaths than encounter.

With a numerous fleet of transports, however, so foul and unprepared as those in the ports of Alexandria, flight must be evidently hopeless, and indeed impracticable, even if there were not such vigilant and gallant commanders to evade, or overcome, as NELSON, TROWBRIDGE, and BALL!

close at hand. In this supposition, they think it but right that France should have her share of the spoils ; and the part allotted to her is Egypt.

If this fall of the Ottoman Empire (which is very far from being so certain, when we consider the discussions and the variety of oppositions it would produce amongst the great powers of Europe, even among those who might have combined for this very object ; when we consider still further, that it will be eternally the interest of France, England, Prussia, and even the Empire, to oppose it) ; if this fall, I say, should after all take place, France will always be in time to have Egypt. Besides, the French will be invited there by the Turks themselves, whenever the latter find themselves menaced by the Russians, whom they mortally hate.

France is so fine a country ; the French are so powerful by their numbers, their riches, and their situation with respect to the other continental powers, *that they cannot possibly gain any thing by a total overthrow of the system of Europe* ; while, at the same time, this overthrow may give birth to a new and preponderating power, which shall deprive them of all their advantages in the Mediterranean.

Weighing all these circumstances, Citizen Directors, I cannot but conclude that we are too distant, and that events operate too rapidly, to permit us to wait for your orders before we take our resolution ; at least we cannot do so without compromising the interests of the Republic, the safety and the honour of the remains of the army :

That we must infallibly evacuate Egypt, establishing, as the price of this sacrifice, a peace, together with all our ancient connexions, with the Ottomans and the States of Barbary :

That all which you have now to hope for, whatever may be your views on Egypt, depends upon the present intentions of General Kleber, which are to retard the evacuation as long as possible by the delays which he will endeavour to introduce into the negotiation ; if, after all, we are happy enough to be permitted to negotiate :

That finally, if the evacuation should take place without waiting for your orders, it will only be, because it was inevitable ; and because, in the state of ignorance in which we all are, respecting the real situation of France, and of Europe, this evacuation was imperiously called for by prudence, and was not inconsistent with our political interests.

Health and respect.

E. POUSSIELGUE.

## No. XIII.

LIBERTY.

EQUALITY.

Cairo, October 13, 1799.

DUGUA\*, General of Division, to Citizen BARRAS, Director.

Citizen Director,

**I** HAVE written several letters to you since the arrival of the army in Egypt; I know not if any of them have reached you; very few private letters have arrived at the place of their destination †.

I mentioned to you, in some of these letters, that I was exceedingly anxious to return to France; but this anxiety was subordinate to the desire of returning there in a flattering manner, and not with an air of having quitted the army through disgust or fickleness; or through fear, either of the plague, or of the numerous enemies, Russians, English, Turks, Arabs, and Mamelouts, which threaten Egypt in four or five different points—Alexandria, El Arisch, the Red Sea, and the Desert.

I seize the opportunity of your cousin's return, to give you a few details respecting our actual situation, which, perhaps, has not yet been set before you in its true light. I had the command of two thirds of Egypt during the expeditions of Syria and Aboukir. I know its produce, its resources, the strength of the places, *which some people call fortresses*, the roads by which they may be avoided, the disposition of the inhabitants, the state of the army, of the arsenals and the magazines, and the finances. I am about to present you with a rapid sketch of all these various objects; and you will then be enabled to judge if it be not absolutely indispensable for Government to come to our immediate assistance.

I shall say but little to you on the departure of the General. It was only communicated to those who were to accompany him. It was precipitated.

\* *Though last not least.* If there be yet any doubts of the falsehood, incompetence, and unfeeling barbarity of Bonaparte, this excellent letter must effectually remove them. It is written by an officer high in command, confident of his knowledge, and appealing without hesitation to his established character for the credit of facts which Bonaparte will now find it impossible to palliate or deny.

† This alludes to a circumstance frequently hinted at in the course of this Correspondence. A very general persuasion prevailed in the army, that the letters of individuals were examined by Bonaparte's orders; and, if found hostile to his views, kept back and destroyed.

A suspicion of this nature can neither be proved nor disproved here; indeed it so happens, that it is of no consequence either way, since the *belief* that he was capable of such a crime does him as little honour as the actual commission of it.

For the rest, it is needless to call the reader's attention by slight remarks from the perusal of this most important document. It contradicts the General's statements in every point, and that with a boldness derived from superior knowledge and truth: it arraigns the base and cowardly desertion of his army in terms of strong and manly indignation; and it speaks of the sufferings and despair of that deserted army in a manner that, if there be one spark of feeling, one sentiment of honour yet left in France, will produce a cry of universal indignation and horror, and drive the "IDOL OF A FORTNIGHT" from his imaginary throne.



The army was thirteen days without a Commander in Chief. There was not a fous in any of the military chests; no part of the service arranged; the enemy scarce retired from Aboukir was still before Damietta. Such was our situation at Cairo from the 18th of August to the 30th.

I confess to you, Citizen Director, that I *could never have believed General Bonaparte would have abandoned us in the condition in which we were; without money, without powder, without ball, and one part of the soldiers without arms.* Alexandria is a vast entrenched camp, which the expedition into Syria has deprived of a considerable portion of the heavy artillery necessary for its defence. Lesbè, near Damietta, is scarcely walled in; part of the wall of El Arisch is tumbling of itself. Debts to an enormous amount; more than a third of the army destroyed by the plague, the dysentery, by ophthalmia, and by the war; that which remains almost naked, and the enemy but eight days march from us! Whatever may be told you at Paris, this description is but too true. You know me to be incapable of imposing on you by a false one.

A numerous army is assembling in Syria; fleets, of which we know not the strength, threaten our coasts, which we know to be accessible in many places. The Commander in Chief cannot bring together more than 7000 fighting men; the enemy have it in their power to make three separate attacks at the same time—what can 7000 men (and those necessarily divided) hope to do?

We have against us the Mussulman fanaticism, which cannot be softened or diminished; the idea of a Christian government is a real torment for the people. The severest examples do not prevent the country people from rising against us at the least report to our disadvantage, or at the most insignificant *firman* dispersed against us.

The country, however, is very fine; the possession of it may be useful to the Republic in many points of view. The productions of every quarter of the globe may be raised here. If these advantages determine the Government to exert itself to preserve Egypt, there is not a moment to lose; men, arms, powder, lead, cannon-balls, &c. &c. must be sent us without the smallest delay.

If the Government cannot succour us, if it cannot appease the Ottoman Court, and recall it to its true interests; if, in short, we are abandoned here to ourselves, compelled to continue fighting, one against ten, to struggle with the most cruel maladies, all that France will ever see again of the "Army of Egypt," will be the maimed and the blind, if the Turks should have the humanity to send them back. The rest will perish here, exhausted by their fatigues and their victories!

I repeat my solemn assurances, Citizen Director, that what you have just read is the most exact truth. A thousand reasons may have prevented its being hitherto fairly laid before you. I have done it, because I persuade myself that I could not have given you a more convincing proof of my sincere attachment; and because I owe these details of the "Army of Egypt" to the Government and to my country.

Health and respect.

DUGUA.

## No. XV.

*Letter from BONAPARTE to the GRAND VIZIER, dated 4....., 1214  
(Mahometan Era).*

TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE SUPREME VIZIER, ABSOLUTE VICAR OF THE GREATEST OF THE GREAT, OF THE JUDICIOUS AND INTELLIGENT, AND OF THE GREATEST OF ALL THE MONARCHS OF THE EARTH, THE EMPEROR OF THE OTTOMANS\*.

THE object of the present letter, addressed to your Excellency, and transmitted by the hands of the Effendi made prisoner at Aboukir, is to furnish you with a faithful view of the state of things in Arabia: and, by putting an end to the war which has taken place between the Sublime Porte and the French Republic, to give peace to those two powers.

Alas! why, after having been friends for so many years, do they now find themselves at war? Is it because the boundaries of the two States are so distant from each other that they fight? Is it because the Courts of Germany and Russia border on the territories of the Sublime Porte that they have united themselves with it?

Your Excellency cannot be ignorant that the French nation, without exception, is extremely attached to the Sublime Porte. Endowed as your Excellency is with the most distinguished talents, and acquainted with the real interests of Courts, can it have escaped you that the Russians and Austrians have conspired, once for all, against the Sublime Porte, and that the French, on the contrary, are using every possible effort to counteract their wicked designs? Your Excellency knows that the Russians are the enemies of the Mussulman faith, and that Paul the Third †, Emperor of Russia, as

\* There are two copies of this curious state paper: the one, faithfully translated from the Arabic by the Turkish Government, and transmitted from Constantinople; the other, loosely, but elegantly rendered from the same original by the French, and found amongst the Intercepted Papers.

The first only is translated, as being infinitely more to be relied on than that so elaborately framed at Cairo, and expressly calculated for the meridian of Paris. The general tenour, however, of both is the same: an incidental variation or two will be noticed.

To remark upon the particular points of this paper would be endless. Whoever sits down to peruse it must prepare himself for all that ignorance, blasphemy, meanness, and hypocrisy—all that misrepresentation, defeating its own purpose, and falsehood, so gross as to be felt, can suggest to a contracted and senseless mind, incapable of directing any scheme of policy, yet presumptuously venturing upon all.

† This Paul the Third is an Emperor of Bonaparte's own creation. Since the French laid aside the Red Book, they have fallen into strange errors! One of their profound legislators lately exclaimed, amidst the shouts of the admiring senate: "What! Francis the First dare to brave the anger of the Great Nation! Well, he shall be Francis the Last!!!"

But how must the Grand Vizier (acquainted, as Bonaparte says he is, with the interest of Courts, and who must be supposed to be so, in some degree, whether he had said it or no), how must he have smiled, with mingled pity and contempt, at the foolish stupidity, the whining and hypocritical cant of the person to whom the interests of a powerful nation were entrusted!

Grand Master of Malta, that is to say, Chief Knight, has solemnly sworn enmity to the Mussulmen. The French have abolished the Order of Malta, given liberty to the Mahometan prisoners detained there, and have the same belief as themselves, that "*There is no God but the true God* \*." It is then very strange that the Sublime Porte should declare war on the French, its real and sincere friends; and contract alliances with the Russians and Germans, its declared enemies.

When the French were necessarily of the sect of the Messiah, they were the friends of the Sublime Porte; now, that they are, as it were, united by the same religion, that Power declares war against them†!! The Courts of England and Russia have led the Sublime Porte into an error. We have *informed* it by letters of our intended expedition into Arabia; but those Courts found means to intercept and conceal our papers‡; and, as if I had not proved to the Sublime Porte that the French Republic, far from wishing to deprive it of its domains, had not even the smallest intention of making war on it; His Most Glorious Majesty, Sultan Selim, gave credit to the English, and conceived an aversion for the French, his ancient friends. Is not the kind treatment which the ships of war and merchantmen belonging to the Sublime Porte, in the different ports of Arabia, experienced at my hands, a sufficient proof of the extreme desire, and love of the French Republic, for peace and amity? The Sublime Porte, without waiting for the arrival of the French Minister Descorches, who had already left France for Constantinople, and without inquiring what were the motives for my conduct, declared war against the French, with the most unaccountable precipitation§. Although I was informed of this war, I dispatched Beauchamp, Consul of the Republic, in the Caravel, in full confidence of terminating it; and while I was expecting the answer of the Sublime Porte by the same conveyance, I found that he had been thrown into prison, and Turkish troops dispatched to Gaza, with orders to take possession of Arabia.

Upon this I thought it more advisable to make war there than in the territory of Egypt; and I was obliged, in spite of myself, to cross the Desert.

\* A sentence taken from the Coran. In the original it is properly marked as a quotation.

† This precious sentiment is thus expressed in the intercepted translation: "So then, the Sublime Porte, which was the friend of France while she was a Christian nation, has declared war against her the instant she adopted, as it were, the Mussulman faith!"

‡ This assertion is *positively* contradicted by Kléber; who labours to excuse the French Government to the Porte, for the omission of this *information*, by alleging the necessity of secrecy as to the object of the armament.

Kléber had Bonaparte's letter before him when he introduced this remarkable deviation from it. What must have been that General's opinion—what must now be the opinion of the world, of its veracity?

§ The drudgery of remarking on this effusion of folly and wickedness is inconceivable. In consequence of the just indignation of the Porte at the invasion of Egypt, Descorches was dispatched to inform it of the *amicable* intentions of France in this act of unprovoked hostility. Yet Bonaparte has the stupid insolence to make the crime of the Porte to be, the not waiting for Descorches' arrival!!!



Although my army is as innumerable as the sands of the sea \*, full of courage, inured to war in the highest degree, and victorious; although it is completely provided with every thing of which it can stand in need: though I have castles and fortresses of prodigious strength, and though the centre and the extremities of the Desert are fortified by batteries of cannon; although I have no fear nor apprehension of any kind; though I have no precautions to take, and that it is impossible for me to be overcome;—nevertheless, out of commiseration for the human race, respect for those honourable ways of proceeding which are respected by all nations, and, above all, out of a desire to be reunited with the first and truest of our allies, His Most Glorious Majesty Sultan Selim, I now make manifest my disposition for peace. It is certain that the Sublime Porte can never realize its wishes by force of arms, and that its happiness can only be effectual by a pacific conduct. Whatever armies may march against Cairo, I can repulse them all.—And yet I will facilitate, as much as possible, every proposition which shall be made me tending to peace. The instant the Sublime Porte shall have detached itself from our enemies, the Russians and English, there cannot be a doubt but that the French Republic will renew and re-establish, in the completest manner, the bases of peace and friendship with the Sublime Porte.

It will be better for you to cease your exertions in forming armies, and amassing provisions and warlike stores to no purpose. Your enemy is not in Arabia. He is in Bulgaria, at Corfu, and, by your mistaken policy, in the heart of the Mediterranean. Augment the number of your ships, put them in good order, and form a corps of able cannoniers. Let not the sacred banner of the Prophet be displayed against the French, but prepare yourselves to make use of it against the Germans and Russians, who, after smiling at the rupture, which has so inconsiderately and imprudently taken place between us, will suddenly raise their heads, and, with a loud and piercing cry, offer you the most burdensome propositions.

\* It is but just to observe, that there is a considerable variation in the sense of the corresponding passages in this and the intercepted copy. That says—"My army is strong, perfectly disciplined, and amply provided with every thing that can render it victorious over your armies, though *they* be as innumerable as the sands of the sea." Whether this *qui-pro-quo* arises from the imperfect wording of the Arabic, or from an idea in Bonaparte, that the original rhodomontade was too extravagant for France, cannot be told. The Turks could have no temptation to exaggerate the absurdity of this matchless production. Enough remained, though this boast had been withdrawn, to provoke the bitter smile of the Ottoman Court. But what must have been the sensations of the Grand Vizier, when he heard Bonaparte vaunt of the *ample manner* in which his army was supplied, when (as it appears from Kléber) he well knew it to be perishing with want; or of his being *invincible*, when the whole of his (the Vizier's) long march, from Damascus to Gaza, had been over the mangled carcases of the French, whom the General had left to the hyænas of Syria, in his hasty and disgraceful flight?

With this observation this letter is left to the scorn of the world.

The English reader, when he compares it with BONAPARTE's parting instructions to KLEBER, will not fail to be struck with the SINCERITY of an overture, which is not to be followed up at all except 1500 Frenchmen shall have died of the plague, and which, in that case, is to be followed up only by a negotiation PURELY TO GAIN TIME.

If you wish to have Egypt—tell me so. France has never entertained an idea of taking it out of the hands of the Sublime Porte, and swallowing it up. Give authority to your Minister who is at Paris, or send some one to Egypt, with full and unlimited powers, and all shall be arranged without animosity, and to your wish.

Enter upon the way that will enable you to take vengeance of your enemies. Labour to consolidate and strengthen the foundations of the Ottoman Empire. Employ all your influence to prevent the acceptance of the propositions which will be made to you by your enemies, as well as to turn aside the terrible and destructive projects which they may unhappily have set on foot at this moment. Having had, during the past, so many motives to abhor the Russians, is it wise to abandon the Black Sea to them, and not rather to exact vengeance? Say but a single word on this last head, and I will exert myself for your advantage. The French army is by no means desirous of convincing the Ottoman forces of its discipline and courage; it would rather unite with them to punish their common enemy.

If your Excellency, to whom I have addressed my wishes in this letter, will send for M. Beauchamp, who is on the Black Sea, and question him on the subject, I am persuaded you will abandon the unfavourable opinion you now have of me. If it depended on my exertions, the day on which I should be able to extinguish the flames of a war so absurd and so unbecoming both parties, would be reckoned by me as the most happy of my life.

BONAPARTE.

THE END.

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